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Limiting Legal Remedies: An Analysis of
Unclean Hands
T Leigh Anenson'
[T]he clean hands doctrine ... ought not to be called a maxim of equity
because it is by no means confined to equity . . . .
Zechariah Chafee, Jr.
INTRODUCTION
U NCLEAN hands is perhaps the most powerful and least containabledefense that came from ancient courts of equity. Since the American
Revolution, courts have been shooting off decisions on this equitable
doctrine like Roman candles. "Broader"' and "newer"' than other
I Associate Professor, University of Maryland Robert H. Smith School of Business;
Of Counsel, Reminger Co., L.PA. This article was the recipient of the Outstanding Paper
Award at the 2009 Annual Conference of the Pacific Southwest Academy of Legal Studies in
Business. The author is grateful for the support and comments of the members and attendees
of the conference. Thanks also to Abe Herzberg, Julie Manning Magid, Gideon Mark, Kevin
Marshall, Don Mayer, Tom Rutledge, Paul von Nessen, and Eric Yordy for their reviews and
critiques. This Article was written as part of my doctoral thesis in conjunction with fulfilling
the writing requirement for a Doctor of Philosophy at Monash University. Research for the
paper was supported by the 2009 Smith School Summer Research Award.
2 Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Coming into Equity with Clean Hands, 47 MICH. L. REV. 877, 878
(1949) [hereinafter Chafee I].
3 See T Leigh Anenson, Treating Equity Like Law: A Post-Merger Justification of Unclean
Hands, 45 AM. Bus. L.J. 455, 459 (2008) ("Despite its containment mainly to actions in equity,
cases considering the doctrine during the present century already tally in the thousands."
(citation omitted)); see infra note 1o and accompanying text.
4 T Leigh Anenson, The Role of Equity in Employment Noncompetition Cases, 42 AM. Bus.
L.J. 1, 51-52 (2oo5) [hereinafter Anenson, Role of Equity] (citations omitted) (explaining that
unclean hands is broader in application than the defenses of equitable estoppel and waiver);
see also T. Leigh Anenson, Beyond Chafee: A Process-Based Theory of Unclean Hands, 47 AM. Bus.
L.J. 509, 566-72 (2010) [hereinafter Anenson, Process-Based Theory of Unclean Hands] (compar-
ing unclean hands to estoppel as well as to the legal doctrines of in pari delicto and fraud on
the court).
5 Anenson, supra note 3, at 466 n.63 ("Unclean hands is considerably newer than most
equitable doctrines."); see also ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY 2 (1950)
(unclean hands "is a rather recent growth"); Id. at 5 (describing unclean hands as "a child
beside some other maxims ... mature in Shakespeare's day" (citation omitted)). Chief Baron
Eyre of the English Court of Exchequer (which had equity powers) adopted the doctrine in
Deringv. Earl of Winchelsea, (1787) 29 Eng. Rep. I184 (Ch.) I186; I Cox Eq. Cas. 318,319-20.
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equitable defenses, discretionary dismissals' for unclean hands are not
limited to illegality, but extend to any inequitable, unconscionable, or bad
faith conduct that is connected to the case.' For reasons of court and party
protection, judges have invoked unclean hands to preclude an assortment
of common law and statutory causes of action.'
Zechariah Chafee, Jr. was the first scholar to undertake a comprehensive
analysis of the defense in the United States.' In 1949, he remarked on the
6 Like other equitable doctrines, dismissal for unclean hands is discretionary in na-
ture. Anenson, supra note 3, at 461 (citation omitted); see also ROBERT MEGARRY & P.V BAKER,
SNELLS PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY 105-06 (27th ed. 1973); RALPH A. NEWMAN, EQUITY AND LAW:
A COMPARATIVE STUDY 28 (1961) ("[RJelief in the court of the Chancellor was granted ac-
cording to criteria which were not confined by rules of strict logic or by analogy to prior deci-
sions."). For the historical origin and evolution of equitable discretion generally, see T Leigh
Anenson, The Triumph of Equity: Equitable Estoppel in Modern Litigation, 27 RE. LITIG. 377,
384-87 (2oo8).
7 See, e.g., Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 8o6, 815
(1945) ("[O]ne's misconduct need not necessarily have been of such a nature as to be punish-
able as a crime or as to justify legal proceedings of any character. Any willful act concerning
the cause of action which rightfully can be said to transgress equitable standards of conduct is
sufficient cause for the invocation of the maxim .... "); 2 JOHN NORTON POMEROY, A TREATISE
ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE As ADMINISTERED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA § 399 (SPENCER
W. SYMONS ED., 5TH ED. 1941) ("The dirt upon his [or her] hands must be his [or her] bad con-
duct in the transaction complained of.").
8 See generally Anenson, Process-Based Theory of Unclean Hands, supra note 4, at 527-41
& nn.71-I 19 (citing cases articulating policies of unclean hands). The US Supreme Court in
Keystone Driller Co. v. General Excavator Co., articulated unclean hands as follows:
[Tihat whenever a party who, as actor, seeks to set the judicial machin-
ery in motion and obtain some remedy, has violated conscience, or good
faith, or other equitable principle, in his [or her] prior conduct, then the
doors of the court will be shut against him [or her] in limine; the court
will refuse to interfere on his [or her] behalf, to acknowledge his for her]
right, or to award him [or her] any remedy.
Keystone Driller Co. v. Gen. Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 240, 244-45 (1933), (quoting JOHN
NORTON POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE As ADMINISTERED IN THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA § 397 (4 th ed. 1918)). In a later case, the Supreme Court explained the
rationale of unclean hands: "That doctrine is rooted in the historical concept of court of equity
as a vehicle for affirmatively enforcing the requirements of conscience and good faith. This
presupposes a refusal on its part to be 'the abetter of iniquity."' Id. at 814 (quoting Bein v.
Heath, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 228, 247 (1848)).
9 Zechariah Chafee, Jr., a practitioner and law professor at Harvard Law School, was a
noted scholar of equity jurisprudence. See Chafee I, supra note 2, at 877 n.**; see also Edgar
N. Durfee, Foreword to ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY, at ix-xi (1950).
The Thomas M. Cooley Lectures that he delivered at the University of Michigan Law School in
1949 and his subsequent publications in the Michigan Law Review continue to be the primary
description of the American experience with the equitable defense. See, e.g., Chafee I, supra
note 2; Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Coming into Equity with Clean Hands, 47 MICH. L. REV. Io65
(1949) [hereinafter Chafee II].
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"astonishing number" of cases decided under the doctrine. 0 Even then, the
broad coverage of unclean hands comprised myriad forms of misbehavior
barring an array of state and federal claims." Chafee's analysis focused
solely on the defense in suits seeking equitable remedies, 2 and a long-
standing treatise advises that it is not available in damages and other so
called legal actions." But adjudications in state and federal courts evidence
the expansion of unclean hands into matters of legal relief.14
Indeed, in a case of first impression, the Michigan Supreme Court
recently recognized unclean hands and dismissed a damages action."
Historically, other state supreme courts have limited its use to actions
involving equitable relief.'" In the federal court system, the United States
Supreme Court has avoided the question of whether a court has authority
to invoke an equitable defense like unclean hands to bar an action for
damages." As a result, the controversy continues in the intermediate
appellate and trial courts of state and federal jurisdictions.'
1o CHAFEE, supra note 5, at 12; cf Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, The Relations Between Equity
and Law, II MICH. L. REV. 537, 550 (1913) (noting maxim of unclean hands to be of "slight
importance" compared to other equitable doctrines (citation omitted)).
II Chafee examined a total of eighteen different groups of cases considering unclean
hands. See Chafee I, supra note 2, at 885-906 (listing eight different groups of cases); Chafee
II, supra note 9, at lo65-96 (listing ten different groups of cases).
12 See generally Chafee I, supra note 2; Chafee II, supra note 9.
13 I DAN B. DOBBS, DOBBS LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES-EQUITY-RESTITUTION §2.4(2)
(2d ed. 1993) ("The most orthodox view of the unclean hands doctrine makes it an equitable
defense, that is, one that can be raised to defeat an equitable remedy, but not one that de-
feats other remedies."). The original edition by Dobbs was the first treatise on the subject of
remedies. Douglas Laycock, How Remedies Became a Field: A History, 27 REv. LITIG. I6I, 261
(2oo8). Laycock describes the treatise as "an invaluable resource that everyone in the field
relies on.... As the treatise ages, it is not so good for finding authoritative cases any more, but
its analysis is still authoritative and it continues to answer questions for novices and old hands
alike." Id. at 262.
14 See discussion infra Part II.
15 See Maldonado v. Ford Motor Co., 719 N.W.2d 809, 818 (Mich. 2oo6) ("'The authority
to dismiss a lawsuit for litigant misconduct is a creature of the "clean hands doctrine" and, de-
spite its origins, is applicable to both equitable and legal damage claims"' (quoting Cummings
v. Wayne Cnty., 533 N.W.2d 13 (1995))); see also infra notes 174-77 and accompanying text.
16 See discussion infra Part I.
17 The United States Supreme Court first recognized the doctrine of clean hands in eq-
uity in Talbotv. Jansen, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 133, 158 (1795). By 1831, the Court called the defense
"well settled." Cathcart v. Robinson, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 264, 276 (183 ).
18 See discussion infra Parts I-II. Courts generally reject the defense at law on the ground
that the legislature limited the consolidation to the courts and their procedures. See Anenson,
supra note 3, at 462-64; see also William E Walsh, Is Equity Decadent?, 22 MINN. L. REv 479,489
(1938) ("Equitable defenses do not become legal defenses under code merger .... "). As such,
courts read the procedural union to exclude the substantive reception of unclean hands which
was used before the merger exclusively against equitable remedies. See Anenson, supra note
3, at 46244; see also WILLIAM QUINBY DE FUNIAK, HANDBOOK OF MODERN EQLITY § 4 (2d ed.
1956) (noting unification of law and equity in the United States was a merger of procedure
20IO-20I1I1 65
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This Article examines the corpus of cases incorporating unclean hands
into the common and statutory law. It provides for a fuller explanation
of the defense in legal cases by looking more closely at its doctrinal
underpinnings.9 Through a description of the arguments and justifications
in the debate over the legal status of unclean hands, this Article seeks to
inform on this divisive issue and aid its resolution.
During the centuries following the merger of law and equity, there has
been continuous and vigorous discussion about the relationship between
these two traditions in the United States and the rest of the common law
world.2 0 These "fusion wars" advance diverse views about the role of law
and equity in the current legal framework." Battle lines have been drawn
around an array of subjects like "property, choice of law ... fiduciaries,
unjust enrichment, [and] ... remedies."n The equitable doctrine of "clean
hands" is now included in that conversation.
The availability of unclean hands in damages actions has not been the
subject of sustained analysis at an appellate level. It remains unresolved in
many jurisdictions, with other courts addressing the issue in error or through
and not substance); NEWMAN, supra note 6, at 51 (explaining that the fusion of law and equity
under federal law was restricted to procedure with the Enabling Act providing that "said rules
shall neither abridge, enlarge nor modify the substantive rights of any litigant"); Id. at 5o
n.I (discussing that the New York "legislative mandate to the Commissioners was reform in
procedure-not alteration of the substantive rules of equity or the common law" (citations
omitted)); cf Harold Greville Hanbury, The Field of Modern Equity, in ESSAYS IN EQUITY 29
(1934) (discussing the same interpretation of equitable defenses given to the English pro-
cedural form). Therefore, despite the rhetoric of completing the union of law and equity, see
Charles E. Clark, [he Union ofLaw and Equity, 25 COLmM. L. REV. I, IO (1925) ("'he union of
law and equity is justly considered to be the foundation principle of the Code reform." (cita-
tion omitted)); Roscoe Pound, The Decadence of Equity, 5 CoiUM. L. REV. 20, 26 (I905) ("[A]
complete absorption or blending of the two systems into one ... is now commonly predicted
by jurists."), the conventional interpretation of the procedural reforms forever banned this
presumably substantive defense in legal cases. See Anenson, supra note 3, at 466. Under this
view, the equitable defense of unclean hands is traditionally available against equitable (and
not legal) remedies. Id. at 465-66 & nn.6o-6i (citing cases).
i9 In comparison to my other research, this Article does not use these cases as concep-
tual building blocks to derive a decision-making framework or to rethink the meaning of the
merger of law and equity. See generaly Anenson, supra note 3, at 455; Anenson, Process-Based
Theory of Unclean Hands, supra note 4, at 509. Instead, this article is a retrospective account of
the background data upon which those theories were based.
20 See Beverley McLachlin, Foreword to EQuITY IN COMMERCIAL LAW, at vii (Simone
Degeling & James Edelman eds., 2005) ("[D]espite the passage of time, the fusion of law
and equity remains a live issue today, subject to debate by academics, practitioners and judges
alike."); Tiong Min Yeo, Choice of Law for Equity, in EQUITY IN COMMERCIAL LAw, supra, at
147,150 ("The extent of the fusion of the substantive rules of common law and equity remains
a matter of great controversy today, and different legal systems in the common law tradition
have adopted different approaches to this question.").
21 NcLachlin, supra note 2o, at vii (using the term to refer to the discussion of the rela-
tionship of law and equity).
22 Id. at viii.
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oversight." Courts have also been frustrated with the lack of doctrinal and
theoretical scholarship considering the availability of unclean hands to bar
legal claims.14This Article aims to end the arbitrariness and judicial extremes
on the subject of unclean hands in an effort to unify this fragmented area of
law. By studying the defense of unclean hands, it celebrates and cultivates
one of law's most remarkable inventions-equity."
Part I reviews court decisions that follow the conventional view that the
equitable defense of unclean hands is limited to claims seeking equitable
remedies. Part II explores the present decisional trend to consider the
defense in cases seeking legal remedies. It studies how the cases are
decided, how the precedents are used, and how the case law of unclean
hands has evolved. It traces the incorporation process within and across
state and federal jurisdictions.
Part III evaluates the future of unclean hands in light of the judicial
justifications for and against the defense at law. It reveals how precedent
and policy analysis dominate the thought processes of judges considering
unclean hands and illustrates how the complex interplay between human
facts and abstract laws that confounded ancient English chancellors
continues to challenge contemporary American judges. This Part suggests
that rather than denying the defense in legal actions in reliance on its
23 See Anenson, supra note 3, at 465-74 (discussing divided court positions on application
of unclean hands at law); discussion infra Part Ill; see also id. at 480-81 (noting cases adopting
unclean hands in legal actions without discussion); Anenson, Process-Based Theory of Unclean
Hands, supra note 4, at 513, 517-18 (discussing cases rejecting unclean hands based on pre-
merger precedent or none at all).
24 One court's perusal of the relevant authorities and precedents found there was "scant
authority on the subject." Unilogic, Inc. v. Burroughs Corp., I2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 741, 745 (Ct. App.
1992) (considering the availability of unclean hands to bar a legal claim). Another court specifi-
cally complained that Chafee's analysis was not helpful and otherwise noted the "sparse prod-
uct" assisting in the application of the defense. Blain v. Doctor's Co., 272 Cal. Rptr. 250, 256
(Cr. App. 1990) (dismissing a damages action for unclean hands). The court complained that
Chafee's analysis "offers no detailed exposition of the case law." Id.; see also Messick v. Smith,
69 A.2d 4 7 8,481 (Md. 1949) ("We have no occasion to pursue the details of Professor Chafee's
interesting iconoclastic discussion, which is revolutionary in classification and nomenclature,
not in application, of legal principles."). The Blain court was also not satisfied with Wigmore's
synopsis of the defense and declared the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 889 commentary "unil-
luminating." Blain, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 256 ("What cases would lie in the first ofWigmore's cate-
gories is not self-explanatory."); accord Ronald J. Allen & Ross M. Rosenberg, LegalPhenomena,
Knowledge, and Theory: A Cautionary Tale of Hedgehogs and Foxes, 77 CHI-KENT L. REv. 683,
69o-95 (2002) (noting courts' and legislatures' general disregard of theoretical scholarship as
opposed to doctrinal scholarship).
25 See, e.g., NEWMAN, supra note 6, at 255 ("The evolution of law is to a large extent
the history of its absorption of equity."); Lionel Smith, Fusion and Tradition, in EQUITY IN
COMMERCIAL LAW, supra note 20, at 19, 30 ("It is no doubt true that the presence of Equity
allowed the common law to under-develop its own brand of equity, and to stand on the side of
certainty and predictability, knowing all the while that in many cases, relief was available else-
where."). See generally William T Quillen, ConstitutionalEquity and the Innovative Tradition, LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1993, at 29 (discussing Delaware's modern equity tradition).
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historical pedigree, the trend of absorbing the equitable defense of unclean
hands into the law will likely continue on the basis of policy.
This Article concludes by placing unclean hands in its broader equitable
context. The cases applying the defense in actions seeking legal remedies
are not only important for what they say, but also for what they represent.
The laboratory that is unclean hands in damages actions could become a
movement to eradicate the legal barrier to equity. To be sure, incorporating
unclean hands into the law may help dissolve default notions of "law" and
"equity" as unassailable symbols of an institution that has yet to grapple
with its own coming of age. 6
I. THE PAST: UNCLEAN HANDS EXCLUSIVE TO EQUITY
Before discussing the growing body of law that recognizes unclean
hands in lawsuits seeking legal remedies in Part II, and its implications
for the future in Part III, this section surveys past court decisions rejecting
unclean hands at law. Under these precedents, the defense is restricted to
its traditional use in cases seeking equitable relief.
The two most recent jurisdictions to deny unclean hands in a lawsuit
seeking damages did so almost a decade ago. The courts' approach
demontrates a narrow outlook on the defense. In Fremont Homes, Inc. v.
Elmer," the Supreme Court of Wyoming supported its denial of the defense
based on precedent considering unclean hands to solely ban equitable
relief.s Correspondingly, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in In re
26 Zechariah Chafee, Jr., expressed his frustration with the continued reliance on law-
equity labels:
How absurd for us to go on until the year 2000 obliging judges and
lawyers to climb over a barrier which was put up by historical accident in
14th century England and built higher by the eagerness of three extinct
courts to keep as much business as possible in their own hands, so that
these hands might be full of fees!
Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Foreword to SELECTED EssAYs ON EQUITY, at iii, iv (Edward D. Re ed.,
1955); see also Keith Mason, Fusion: Fallacy, Future or Finished?, in EQUITY IN COMMERCIAL
LAw, supra note 20, at 41, 65 ("The question of exemplary damages for breach of an exclu-
sively fiduciary duty has been addressed recently in New Zealand, Canada and Australia and
has proved a catalyst for discussion about the fusion of law and equity." (citations omitted));
Douglas Laycock, The Triumph of Equity, 56 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1993, at 53, 78
(describing law and equity as a "dysfunctional proxy for a series of functional choices"); Doug
Rendleman, The Trial Judges Equitable Discretion Following eBay v. MercExchange, 27 REV.
LITIG. 63,97 (2007) ("It would be salutary, I submit, for the profession to discard the nonfunc-
tional terminology of separate legal and equitable discretion."); Robert S. Stevens, A Plea for
the Extension of Equitable Principles and Remedies, 41 CORNELL L.Q. 351, 351 (1956) (explaining
that the distinction between law and equity was not necessary or essential, but historical).
27 Fremont Homes, Inc. v. Elmer, 974 P.2d 952 (Wyo. 1999).
28 Id. at 959 (lawsuit seeking damages for breach of employment contract). The Wyoming
Supreme Court also cited section I02 of C.J.S. for support. Id. This C.J.S. section misstated
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Estate of Barnes"9 was persuaded to deny the defense because "we know of
no authority for applying this 'maxim of equity' to a legal claim for money.""
State supreme courts in Georgia,"1 Iowa," Missouri,3 3 and Pennsylvania3 1
have reached similar conclusions, with high courts in Minnesota,3 ' North
Dakota, 6 and New Jersey 7 suggesting an identical outcome.
DiMauro v. Pavia, 492 . Supp. 1051, lo68 (D. Conn. 1979), aff'd614 F.2d 1286 (2d Cir. 1979).
In considering the classic case of unclean hands to estop equitable relief, the DiMauro court
instructed that unclean hands may be invoked "only to prevent affirmative relief." DiMauro,
492 F Supp. at lo68. The legal encyclopedia's version inserted the word "equitable" between
"affirmative" and "relief." See 3oA C.J.S. Equity § 109 (2007), wherein the earlier edition's error
remains uncorrected.
29 In re Estate of Barnes, 754 A.2d 284 (D.C. 2000).
30 Id. at 288 n.6. D.C. precedent on this point stems from Truittv. Miller, 407 A.2d 1073
(D.C. 1979), which relied on Tarasiv. Pittsburgh NationalBank for the proposition that unclean
hands will not defeat legal relief. Traitt, 407 A.2d at 1079-80 (citing Tarasi v. Pittsburgh Nat'l
Bank, 555 F.2d 1152, 1156-57, I156 n.9 (3d Cir. 1977)); see also First Am. Corp. v. Al-Nahyan,
17 E Supp. 2d 10, 29 (D.D.C. 1998) (citing Johns v. Rozet, 141 F.R.D. 211, 220 (D.D.C. 1992);
Truitt, 407 A.2d at 079-80 ("[Under D.C. law, unclean hands acts only as a defense to equi-
table, and not legal, actions.").
31 Holmes v. Henderson, 549 S.E.2d 81, 81-82 (Ga. 2001) (citing Jones v. Douglas Cnty.,
418 S.E.2d 19, 22-23 (Ga. 1992) (discussing the doctrine of laches)).
32 Ellwood v. Mid States Commodities, Inc., 404 N.W.2d 174, 184 (Iowa 1987); see also
Sisson v. Janssen, 56 N.W.2d 30, 34 (Iowa 1952) ("It is of course a doctrine which may be
invoked only to prevent affirmative equitable relief." (citing Spitler v. Perry Town Lot &
Improvement Co., 179 N.W. 69, 70 (Iowa 1920) (ruling without citation that unclean hands
does not bar defenses, only affirmative equitable relief))) (equitable relief case); cf Davenport
Osteopathic Hosp. Ass'n v. Hosp. Serv., Inc, 154 N.W.2d 153, 162 (Iowa 1967) (equitable de-
fense of laches is not a defense to a legal action for breach of contract unless estoppel also
exists).
33 Russell v. Casebolt, 384 S.W.2d 548, 553 (Mo. 1964); see also Marvin E. Neiberg Real
Estate Co. v. Taylor-Morley--Simon, Inc., 867 S.W.2d 618, 626 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993) (holding
that the application of unclean hands is erroneous in an action at law for damages).
34 Universal Builders, Inc. v. Moon Motor Lodge, Inc., 244 A.2d 10, 14 (Pa. 1968); see also
Nedwidek v. Nedwidek, 92 A.2d 536, 537 (Pa. 1952) (discussing Pennsylvania's integration of
law and equity in 1952).
35 See Bieter Co. v. Blomquist, 848 E Supp. 1446, 1450-51 (D. Minn. 1994) (noting that
"Minnesota courts have not directly addressed [the] issue" but concluding that the Minnesota
Supreme Court would not recognize unclean hands in an action for damages (citing Thorem
v. Thorem, 246 N.W. 674, 675 (Minn. 1933); Hagberg v. Colonial & Pac. Frigidways, Inc., 157
N.W.2d 33, 35 (Minn. 1968); LaValle v. Kulkay, 277 N.W.2d 400, 403 n-3 (Minn. 1979))); ac-
cord Foy v. Klapmeier, 992 F2d 774, 779 (8th Cir. 1993) (reaching the same conclusion under
Minnesota law).
36 Landers v. Biwer, 2006 ND 109, ' 9, 714 N.W.2d 476, 480 ("A litigant seeking the
remedy of specific performance is held to a higher standard than one merely seeking money
damages, and to receive equity he must 'do equity' and must not come into court with 'un-
clean hands."' (quoting Sand v. Red River Nat'l Bank & Trust CO., 224 N.W.2d 375, 377-78
(N.D. 1974))).
37 Merchs. Indem. Corp. v. Eggleston, 179 A.2d 505, 514 (N.J. 1962) (citing federal pre-
merger precedent from the United States Supreme Court);seealso Sprenger v. Trout, 866 A.2d
1035, 1045 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005) (relying on Illinois precedent to bar unclean hands
20IO- 20II ] 69
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The state supreme courts of Maine," Mississippi, 9 and West Virginia,40
to name a few, have refused to permit the defense of laches in legal cases. 41
Laches shared the same pre-merger procedural posture as unclean hands,42
suggesting they would deny the latter defense for the same reasons. 43
The status of unclean hands is arguably an open question in Alabama.
In San Ann Tobacco Co., Inc. v. Hamm, the Alabama Supreme Court de-
clared that unclean hands "may not constitute a defense at law,"" but
that decision pre-dated the state's merger of law and equity in 1973.45
In addition, the highest courts in Oregon 46 and Maryland 47 agreed to
in consumer fraud action for damages due to an absence of authority in New Jersey).
38 Strickland v. Cousens Realty, Inc., 484 A.2d oo6, Ioo8 (Me. 1984) (banning the equi-
table defense of laches in legal actions under code pleading).
39 In Aetna Ins. Co. v. Robertson, 94 So. 7 (Miss. 1922), the court stated:
The rule that the enforcement of a right may be barred by laches
is an application of the maxims, Vigilantibus, non dornientibus, subveniunt
leges.... He who comes into equity must come with clean hands.... The
defense of laches is peculiar to courts of equity and is not pleadable in
actions at law.
Id. at 28 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
4o Laurie v. Thomas, 294 S.E.2d 78, 8o-8I (W. Va. 1982).
41 The denial of laches in actions at law is the rule in many states. See, e.g., Kodiak
Elec. Ass'n, Inc. v. DeLaval Turbine, Inc., 694 P.2d 150, 157 (Alaska 1984) (rejecting laches
in legal action based on prevailing view and citing cases from Arkansas, California, Georgia,
Minnesota, Missouri, and New Hampshire). But see Moore v. Phillips, 627 P2d 831, 835 (Kan.
Ct. App. 1981) (citing McDaniel v. Messerschmidt, 382 P.2d 304, 307 (Kan. 1963) (allowing
equitable defense of laches in law actions)); Dep't of Banking and Fin. v. Wilken, 352 N.W.2d
145, 149 (Neb. 1984) (declaring laches available to defeat actions at law); Sutton v. Davis, 916
SWa.2d 937, 941 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995) (stating that "laches may also bar purely legal claims"
(citing Jansen v. Clayton, 816 S.W.2d 49 (Ten. Ct. App. 1991))).
42 See John L. Garvey, Some Aspects of the Merger of Law and Equity, Io CATH. U. L. REV.
59, 66 (1961); E.W. Hinton, Equitable Defenses Under Modern Codes, 18 MICH. L. REv. 717, 719
(1920).
43 Anenson, supra note 3, at 463, 466 n.6o; see also USH Ventures v. Global Telesystems
Grp., Inc., 796 A.2d 7, 20 & n. 18 (Del. Super. Ct. zooo) ("It appears that in most Courts, laches
cannot be asserted in an action at law.").
44 San Ann Tobacco Co., v. Hamm, 217 So. 2d 803, 8io (Ala. 1968) (quoting Harton v.
Little, 65 So. 951, 953 (Ala. 1914)). The quoted language, moreover, came from another equity
case that did not address the issue of the application of unclean hands in legal actions. Rather,
the case concerned what conduct would constitute unclean hands. The phrase was meant to
explain that the fraud or deceit that would amount to unclean hands did not need to be the
same conduct as would constitute fraud or deceit under the common law. Harton, 65 So. at
952-53.
45 See Wootten v. Ivey, 877 So. 2d 585, 588 (Ala. 2003) (discussing merger of law and
equity in 1973).
46 Thompson v. Coughlin, 997 P.2d 191 (Or. aooo).
47 Adams v. Manown, 615 A.2d 611, 616 (Md. 1992). Two dissenting justices would have
denied the applicability of unclean hands to legal actions. Id at 623 (Chasanow, J., concurring
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address the adoptability issue, but ultimately avoided it on appeal.48
The controversy concerning the common law recognition of unclean
hands continues in the lower state courts.49 Courts within New Yorkso and
Oregon"' have reached different conclusions on the subject. Decisions
and dissenting) (citing pre-merger precedent from the court as well as the United States
Supreme Court). Notably, Maryland did not complete the merger of law and equity procedure
until 1984. See id.
48 Thompson, 997 P.2d at 196 n.9; Adams, 615 A.zd at 617.
49 See Gen. Dev. Corp. v. Binstein, 743 F. Supp. II IS, 1133-34, 1134 n.4 (D.N.J. 1990)
(applying Florida, Connecticut, and Massachusetts law to find that unclean hands was un-
available as a defense to claim for tortious interference seeking damages, but was applicable to
request for injunctive relief) ("Unclean hands is an equitable defense. This defense therefore
is only applicable with respect to the plaintiff's claim for equitable relief. . . ."); Sprenger v.
Trout, 866 A.2d 1035, 1045 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005) (relying on Illinois precedent to
bar unclean hands in consumer fraud action for damages).
50 Compare Mallis v. Bankers Trust Co., 615 F2d 68,75 (2d Cir. 1980) (applying New York
law to conclude that unclean hands was available to bar legal relief), and Smith v. Long, 723
N.Y.S.2d 584, 586-87 (App. Div. 2001), with Morrisania II Assocs. v. Harvey, 527 N.Y.S.2d 954,
961 (Civ. Ct. 1988) (unclean hands inapplicable to legal claims) (citing Hasbro Bradley, Inc. v.
Coopers & Lybrand, 515 N.Y.S.2d 461, 463 (App. Div. 1987)).
51 Compare Kirkland v. Mannis, 639 P.2d 671, 672 (Or. Ct. App. 1982) (rejecting applica-
tion of unclean hands to legal action), with Beldt v. Leise, 60 P 3 d 1119, 1121 (Or. Ct. App.
2003) (unclean hands unavailable in actions at law), Thompson v. Coughlin, 927 P.2d 146, 149
(Or. Ct. App. 1996), rev'don othergrounds, 997 P.2d 191, 196 n.9 (Or. 2ooo), andGratreak v. N.
Pac. Lumber Co., 609 P.2d 375, 377-78 (Or. Ct. App. 1980). See also McKinley v. Weidner, 698
P.2d 983, 985-86 (Or. Ct. App. 1985) (acknowledging inconsistent decisions from the same
court).
20IO- 20II J 71
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
from Texas," Illinois,53 Ohio,54 Arizona," Colorado," and Massachusetts 7
have also refused to assimilate the defense of unclean hands. In the fed-
eral courts, the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois" along
52 See McMahan v. Greenwood, io8 S.W. 3 d 467, 494 (Tex. App. 2003); Steubner Realty
19, Ltd. v. Cravens Rd. 88, Ltd., 817 S.W.2d 16o, 165-66 (Tex. App. 1991) (citing Ligon v. E.E
Hutton & Co., 428 S.W.2d 434,437 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968); Furr v. Hall, 553 S.W.2d 666,672-73
(Tex. Civ. App. 1977)). Texas appellate courts have created an exception allowing unclean
hands in law actions to the extent it works an estoppel. See, e.g., Steubner Realty ip, Ltd, 817
S.W. 3 d at 165. These courts also acknowledge a separate defense at law of "unclean acts" that
involve a knowing and willful violation of state criminal law. See Shirvanian v. Defrates, No.
14-02-00 4 4 7-CV, 2004 Tex. App. LEXIS 182, at *41-44 (Tex. App. Jan. 8, 2004) (citing Ward
v. Emmett, 37 S.W.3d 500, 503 (Tex. App. 2001)), withdrawn and substituted on other grounds by,
16 1 S.W 3 d 102 (Tex. App. 2oo4).
53 See Chow v. Aegis Mortg. Corp., 286 F Supp. 2d 956, 964 (N.D. Ill. 2003) ("Under
Illinois law, unclean hands is an equitable remedy not applicable to claims for monetary re-
lief." (citing RIV VIL, Inc. v. Tucker, 979 F Supp. 645,659 (N.D. Ill. 1997))); Zahl v. Krupa, 850
N.E.2d 304, 309-10 (11. App. Ct. 2oo6); cf Villiger v. City of Henry, 362 N.E.2d 120, 121 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1977) (equitable defense of laches applies to both law and equity). Federal district
courts in Illinois have allowed unclean hands in actions at law pursuant to federal law when le-
gal and equitable claims are joined. See Urecal Corp. v. Masters, 413 F Supp. 873, 876 (N.D. Ill.
1976) (diversity); Energizer Holdings, Inc. v. Duracell, Inc., No.o C 9720, 2002 WL io67688,
at *3 (N.D. Ill. May 28, 2002) (Lanham Act).
54 See, e.g., Conklin v. Conklin, No. 14-77-7, 1978 Ohio App. LEXIS 9357, at *24 (Ohio
Ct. App. Feb. 9, 1978) (rejecting unclean hands in an action at law because it is "a strictly
equitable doctrine"); O'Brien v. Ohio State Univ., 139 Ohio Misc. 2d 36, 2006-Ohi-4346, 859
N.E.2d 607, at 57 n.3 (unclean hands doctrine does not defeat legal claim for damages); see
also May v. May, 63 Ohio Misc. 2d 207, 209 (Ct. Com. Pl. 1993) (discussing Ohio history lead-
ing up the 1853 Code of Civil Procedure merging law and equity but noting that substantive
distinctions still survive); cf Smith v. Smith, 156 N.E.2d 113, 119-20 (Ohio 1959) (equitable
defense of laches does not apply to bar legal claim under merged procedures).
55 SeeTripati v. State, 16 P.3 d 783, 786 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2ooo); Ayer v. Gen. Dynamics Corp.,
625 P.2d 913, 915 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980).
56 See Wilson v. Prentiss, 140 P.3 d 288, 293 (Colo. App. 2oo6) ("The doctrine of unclean
hands enables a defendant to raise an equitable defense to defeat equitable remedies, but not
remedies at law.").
57 Howe v. Fiduciary Trust Co., No. 97-2206, 2001 Mass. Super. LEXIS 135, at *30-31
(Super. Ct. Apr. 19, zoo i).
58 Lopez v. Autoserve, L.L.C., No. 05 C 3554, 2005 WL 3116053, at *i (N.D. Ill. Nov.
17, 2005) (applying Illinois and federal law of unclean hands) (striking affirmative defense of
unclean hands to bar violations of state and federal statutory employment law because the
complaint sought only legal damages); see also Miller v. Beneficial Mgmt. Corp., 855 F. Supp.
691, 716 n.28 (D.N.J. 1994) (equating an employer's use of after-acquired evidence of an em-
ployee's misconduct under federal discrimination laws with the defense of unclean hands that
the court presumed was restricted to equitable remedies) (internal citations omitted). Another
district court within the same circuit as Lopez accepted the defense. See Decatur Ventures,
L.L.C. v. Stapleton Ventures, Inc., No. 1:04-CV-o562-JDT-WTL, zoo6 WL 1367436, at *4
(S.D. Ind. May 17, 2oo6) (citing Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 2 & 8), order amended, No.
I:o4-cv-0o562-JDT-WTL, 2oo6 WL 3305122 (S.D. Ind. Aug 16, 2oo6); Columbus Reg'I
Hosp. v Patriot Med. Techs. Inc., No. IP 0-1 4 04-C K/H, 2004 WL 392938, at *7 (S.D. Ind.
Feb I i, 2004) (citing Federal Rules 2 & 8) (denying summary judgment on affirmative de-
fense of unclean hands as a matter of federal law in a diversity case). The Seventh Circuit
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with the Third Circuit Court of Appeals" rejected the defense at law.
Consequently, notwithstanding post-merger criticism calling for the
consideration of all equitable defenses to legal claims,60 unclean hands has
been traditionally dependent on equity jurisdiction.6' But the customary
reticence to recognizing unclean hands at law is changing. Courts recently
have begun to absorb the defense. The next Part details its development
into the law.
II. THE PRESENT LEGAL DEVELOPMENT OF UNCLEAN HANDS
The following analysis traces the doctrinal development of unclean
hands into the state and federal law.
A. State Court Adoption of Unclean Hands
Courts from seven states have declared the doctrine of unclean hands
available in an action at law.62 Its absorption has occurred in dozens of cases
Court of Appeals held unclean hands available in a legal action. Maltz v. Sax, 134 F.2d 2, 7
(7 th Cir. 1943) (applying unclean hands to bar an action for damages under the Sherman
Anti-Trust Act).
59 Tarasi v. Pittsburgh Nat'1 Bank, 555 Ezd 1152,1 156 n.9 (3d Cir. 1977).
60 Zechariah Chafee logically concluded: "[Tihe factors which divide judicial action
from moral judgments seem to me the same whether the particular suit resembles what used
to go on in chancery or what used to go on in the courts of common law." CHAFEE, supra note
5, at 1o2; see also Edward Yorio, A Defense of Equitable Defenses, 51 OHIo ST. L.J. 1201, 1205-26
(1990) (summarizing criticisms of treating legal and equitable defenses differently).
61 "Equity jurisdiction" does not generally refer to power over the subject matter, per-
sons, or property, but refers rather to equity jurisprudence. E.g., DE FUNIAK, supra note 18,
at 37-39 (discussing differing definitions of "equity jurisdiction" as either a court having no
power to act or a court having power to act but that it should not act); Henry H. Ingersoll,
Confusion of Law and Equity, 21 YALE L.J. 58, 6o-6i (1911) (explaining that jurisdiction of any
case in equity does not depend upon an absence of a remedy at law). Such jurisprudence is
conditioned on an equitable remedy.
62 See discussion infra Part II.A.1-7. Federal courts sitting in diversity jurisdiction are
divided on whether to use state or federal law to apply and/or define unclean hands in cases
seeking legal relief. Some federal courts with diversity jurisdiction applied a federal law of
unclean hands. See Columbus Reg'I Hosp. v. Patriot Med. Techs. Inc., No. IP ol-1404-C K/H,
2004 WL 392938, at *7 (S.D. Ind. Feb II, 2004); Big Lots Stores, Inc. v. Jaredco, Inc., 182 F
Supp. 2d 644, 652-53 (S.D. Ohio 2002); Smith v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 124 F.R.D. 103, 105-07
(D. Md. 1989); Urecal Corp. v. Masters, 413 F. Supp. 873, 874-76 (N.D. Ill. 1976); Buchanan
Home & Auto Supply Co. v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 544 E Supp. 242, 244-45 (D.S.C.
1981). Other federal courts with diversity jurisdiction applied a state law of unclean hands.
See Chow v. Aegis Mortg. Corp., 286 F. Supp. 2d 956, 964 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (applying Illinois
law of unclean hands); Gen-Probe, Inc. v. Amoco Corp., 926 E Supp. 948, 952 (S.D. Cal. 1996)
(applying California law of unclean hands in diversity case); Bieter Co. v. Blomquist, 848 E
Supp. 1446, 1450-51 (D. Minn. 199 4 ) (considering whether unclean hands is a valid defense
to state law damage claims under Minnesota law); Gen. Dev. Corp. v. Binstein, 743 F. Supp.
11 15, 1133-34, 1134 n-4 (D.N.J. 1990) (applying Florida, Connecticut and Massachusetts law
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from California, Oregon, Maryland, Michigan, New York, Connecticut,
and Rhode Island." With the exception of Michigan, all the incorporation
decisions have been rendered by lower courts." The Supreme Court of
Michigan recently affirmed the dismissal of a case seeking damages where
the litigant's unclean hands amounted to litigation misconduct."5
1. California.-California received unclean hands as part of the state
common law almost fifty years ago." As the earliest state to adopt the
defense at law, it has the most cases on the subject. 7 Unlike Oregon and
New York, discussed below, California courts are unanimous." California
courts of appeal have considered unclean hands in both tort and contract
actions. 69 Decisions have made the defense available to preclude conversion,
malicious prosecution, and legal malpractice, as well as to bar the foreclosure
of a mechanic's lien.70 While earlier opinions carefully considered whether
of unclean hands). Because many courts have not acknowledged the source of law issue for
unclean hands, it is often difficult to discern. In this section on state court adoption, I have
included only federal courts that have clearly used a state law of unclean hands.
63 See discussion infra Part II.A.i-7. While Kansas has no cases addressing the avail-
ability of unclean hands in actions at law, a court of appeals relied on the doctrine as a ground
to apply the after-acquired evidence defense to bar damages in a contract claim for wrongful
discharge. Gassman v. Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan Soc'y, Inc., 921 P2d 224, 230
(Kan. Ct. App. 1996), as modified by Gassman v. Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan Soc'y,
Inc., 933 P2d 743, 744 (Kan. 1997) (affirming adoption of after-acquired evidence doctrine
without discussion of unclean hands); see also Moore v. Phillips, 627 P.2d 831, 835 (Kan. Ct.
App. 1981) (citing McDaniel v. Messerschmidt, 382 P.2d 304 (Kan. 1963) (allowing equitable
defense of laches in law actions)).
64 See Maldonado v. Ford Motor Co., 719 N.W.zd 809, 818 (Mich. 2oo6); see also discus-
sion infra Part II.A.5.
65 Maldonado, 719 N.W.2d at 818.
66 See Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. E. Bay Union of Machinists, Local 1304, 39 Cal.
Rptr. 64, 96-97 (Dist. Ct. App. 1964).
67 See infra Part II.A.2-7 (discussing incorporation of unclean hands into the law in states
other than California).
68 See, e.g., Bio-Psychiatric-Toxicology Lab., Inc. v. Radcliff & West, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d 853,
861 (Ct. App. 1997) ("In modern times the doctrine has been held applicable to suits for legal
as well as equitable relief." (citing Fibreboard, 39 Cal. Rptr. at 96-97)); Vacco Indus., Inc. v. Van
Den Berg, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d 602, 612 (Ct. App. 1992) ("This is a principle which has application
in a legal action as well as one in equity.. . ." (citation omitted)); see also Al-Ibrahim v. Edde,
897 E Supp. 620, 626 (D.D.C. 1995) (applying California and Nevada law).
69 Camp v. Jeffer, Mangels, Butler & Marmaro, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d 329,340 (Ct. App. 1995)
("In California, the doctrine of unclean hands may apply to legal as well as equitable claims
and to both tort and contract remedies." (internal citation omitted)).
70 See Unilogic, Inc. v. Burroughs Corp., 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d 741, 745-47 (Ct. App. 1992) (con-
version); Pond v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 198 Cal. Rptr. 517,521-23 (Ct. App. 1984) (malicious pros-
ecution); Blain v. Doctor's Co., 272 Cal. Rptr. 250, 256-58 (Ct. App. 1990) (legal malpractice);
Burton v. Sosinsky, 250 Cal. Rptr. 33, 41 (Ct. App. 1988) ("California has taken the position
that this defense is available in a legal action." (citation omitted)); see also id. ("Although no
case directly on point has been located, we see no reason why a successful defense of unclean
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to apply the defense on a claim-by-claim basis, later opinions broadly echo
its applicability in all cases. 7 1
The process of integration began with Fibreboard Paper Products Corp.
v. East Bay Union of Machinists, Local 1304.72 In a case of "first impression,"
the appellate court questioned whether the equitable defense of unclean
hands applies as a defense to a legal action." It answered the question in the
affirmative.7 4 The court of appeals relied on language from prior Supreme
Court of California cases interpreting the merger of law and equity." While
unclean hands was not at issue, these decisions declared that "under the
system of Code pleading equitable defenses . . . may be set up in actions
at law."" The court of appeals in Fibreboard, however, affirmed the denial
of the defense because it found a lack of evidence to satisfy the doctrine's
definitional elements.7
hands should not bar the foreclosure of the mechanics' lien.").
71 Compare Gen-Probe, Inc. v. Amoco Corp., 926 F SuPP. 948, 952 (S.D. Cal. 1996) (ap-
plying California law) (declaring the defense available to bar legal conversion claims in reli-
ance on Unilogic, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d, at 745-748), with Alan Klarik Enters., Inc. v. Viva Optique,
Inc., No. B179607, 2oo6 WL 2423552, at *5 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 23, 2oo6) ("{Uinclean hands
applies not only to actions seeking equitable relief, but applies as well today as a defense to
legal actions."), Travel Am., Inc. v. Camp Coast To Coast, Inc., Nos. G028513, G028738, 2003
WL 558563, at *4 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 27, 2003) (unclean hands operates as a bar to the entire
lawsuit asserting legal and equitable claims), and Kendall-Jackson Winery, Ltd. v. Superior
Court, go Cal. Rptr. 2d 743, 749 (Ct. App. 1999) ("The defense is available in legal as well as
equitable actions." (citations omitted)).
72 Fibreboard, 39 Cal. Rptr. 64.
73 Id. at 96. The court cited two prior California appellate court cases. Id. at 96-97. A.I.
Gage Plumbing Supply Co. v. Local 300 of the International Hod Carriers, 20 Cal. Rptr. 86o,
865-66 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962) indicated that unclean hands was available to deny the right
to seek damages, but did not find that the conduct constituted unclean hands and did not
disclose whether any contention was made before the reviewing court that the defense was
inapplicable. Morrison v. Willhoit, 145 P.2d 707, 710 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1944) dealt generally
with the use of equitable principles in a legal demand and did not address the issue of unclean
hands.
74 Fibreboard, 39 Cal. Rptr. at 97.
75 Id. (citing Carpentier v. City of Oakland, 30 Cal. 439, 442 (1866) (fraud) and Terry
Trading Corp. v. Barsky, 292 P 474, 478 (Cal. 1930) (accounting)).
76 Terry Trading Corp., 292 P. at 478; see also Carpentier, 30 Cal., at 442 ("Under our system
of practice a defendant is allowed to set up as many defenses as he may have, regardless of the
question as to whether they are of a legal or equitable nature, because the distinction which
exists under the common law system between actions at law and suits in equity and the forms
thereof have been abolished.").
A later case from the Supreme Court of California considering the right to trial by jury
found that "cases legal and equitable have not been consolidated ... [and] the distinction
between law and equity is as naked and broad as ever." Philpott v. Superior Court, 36 P2d
635, 636-37 (Cal. 1934); see also Cnty. of L.A. v. City of Alhambra, 612 P.2d 24, 31 (Cal. 1980)
(finding laches only available in equity).
77 Fibreboard, 39 Cal. Rptr. at 98 (affirming denial and amendment to the answer plead-
ing unclean hands because it found no connection between the plaintiff's claim in tort and the
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Goldstein v. Lees" followed Fibreboard's ruling that unclean hands is
available in a claim for damages." It reversed the trial court ruling and
applied the doctrine to deny an attorney recovery for services rendered
in violation of professional ethics rules.so Pond v. Insurance Co. of North
America" also followed Fibreboardin applying unclean hands to bar a claim
for malicious prosecution." The malicious prosecution cause of action in
Pond was predicated on an unsuccessful indemnity suit filed by an insurer
against an insurance agent arising out of a wrongful death action." The agent
knowingly withheld critical evidence and made other misrepresentations
relevant to the insurer's defense in the underlying litigation that caused
it to settle." Because the agent's nondisclosures would have changed the
outcome of the indemnity suit upon which he predicated his malicious
prosecution claim, the court of appeals agreed with the trial court and
barred his action for damages."
Unilogic, Inc. v. Burroughs Corp." further extended the application of
unclean hands to a conversion claim." The case involved a business dispute
in which both sides claimed various tort and contract violations arising out
defendant's alleged breach of contract and fraudulent misrepresentation). "It would amount
to a straining of the doctrine to hold that defendants could escape liability for tort because
Fibreboard breached its contract-or because it was guilty of fraudulent misrepresentations."
Id. at 97.
78 Goldstein v. Lees, 120 Cal. Rptr. 253 (Ct. App. 1975).
79 Id. at 255.
8o Id. at 255 n.2 (relying on unclean hands as alternative holding).
8 i Pond v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 198 Cal. Rptr. 517 (Ct. App. 1984).
82 Id. at 522-23.
83 Id. at 521-23. The procedural history of the case is as follows: insurer defended in-
sured in wrongful death action under reservation of rights. Id. at 519. Insured filed declaratory
judgment action against insurer. Id. Insurer filed cross-complaint against the agent who is-
sued the policy alleging his actions weakened its position and caused it to settle the original
personal injury lawsuit. Id.
84 Id. at 519-20, 521-23. The court explained:
The coverage issue in the defense of the wrongful death case was
whether the lower pilot minimums were the ones agreed upon, an is-
sue left ambiguous by Pond's conduct. It was upon this basis that the
first suit was settled and INA's detriment incurred, largely as a result of
Pond's nondisclosures and misrepresentations.
Id. at 522.
85 Id. at 522-23 (characterizing the agent's conduct in bringing the malicious prosecution
action as "classic'chutzpah"' and affirming the dismissal for unclean hands (citation omitted)).
The court of appeals alternatively held that summary judgment was appropriate because the
insurer relied on the good faith advice of counsel negating the element of an absence of prob-
able cause. Id. at 520-21.
86 Unilogic, Inc. v. Burroughs Corp., 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d 741 (Ct. App. 1992).
87 Id. at 745.
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of a failed joint project to develop new technology." Unilogic alleged that
Burroughs tortiously converted its new technology.8 9 Burroughs claimed
unclean hands based on Unilogic's failure to return certain proprietary
software upon termination of the joint development project and its use of
the software in attempting to sell products to Burroughs' competitors.90
In considering the availability of unclean hands to bar the legal claim of
conversion, the court found there was "scant authority on the subject."9 It
noted that Pondand Goldstein cited Fibreboardwith approval for the general
proposition that "the unclean hands doctrine is not confined to equitable
actions, but is also available in legal actions."" It then affirmed the trial
court's decision to apply the defense because "Unilogic has not provided us
with any reason, based on policy or otherwise, for holding that the unclean
hands defense is never available in a legal action for conversion." 93
Another line of California authority supporting the adoption of unclean
hands began in Blain v. Doctor' Co.94 Without discussing Fibreboard or its
progeny, the court of appeals in Blain applied the defense to bar a legal
malpractice action arising out of a medical malpractice lawsuit." The client
brought the claim against his attorney after relying on his counsel's advice to
lie at his deposition. 6 In determining whether the perjury should constitute
unclean hands, the court disregarded the application issue and focused on
88 Id. at 742-43.
89 Id at 743-44.
90 Id.
91 Id at 745.
92 Id. at 745 (quoting Goldstein v. Lees, 120 Cal. Rptr. 253, 255 n.2 (Ct. App. 1975)) (cit-
ing Pond v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 198 Cal. Rptr. 517, 522 (Ct. App. 1984)). Unilogic also reviewed
the recognition of the defense in Blain v. Doctor's Co., 272 Cal. Rptr. 250 (Ct. App. i990), dis-
cussed infra notes 93-loo and accompanying text, to bar a legal malpractice action. Unilogic,
I2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 744.
93 Unilogic, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 745. Citing both Fibreboard and Uni/ogic, the district court
in Gen-Probe, Inc. v. Amoco Corp., applied California law and declared the defense available
to bar legal claims in general, and conversion claims in particular. Gen-Probe, Inc. v. Amoco
Corp., 926 F. SuPp. 948, 952 (S.D. Cal. 1996) (finding no connection between the conduct
constituting unclean hands and the lawsuit). In Gen-Probe, two cases were pending before the
court involving a business dispute over the ownership of a patent. Id. at 951. Gen-Probe was
seeking to expedite and consolidate discovery with the related case set for trial where it was
the defendant in order to better prepare its unclean hands defense. Id. at 95 1-952. The basis
of its defense was the party opponent's filing of the related lawsuit with competitor funding.
Id. at 95 1. While the court questioned whether the filing ofa lawsuit could ever constitute un-
clean hands in the same case, it ultimately rejected the use of unclean hands because it found
the funding issue unrelated to the specific issues in the complaint. Id at 952.
94 Blain v. Doctor's Co., 272 Cal. Rptr. 250 (Ct. App. 1990).
95 Id. at 258-259 (affirming dismissal on the basis that unclean hands precluded physi-
cian's damages for emotional distress and loss of ability to practice medicine).
96 Id. at 252.
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the policies of the doctrine." Quoting Chafee, the court explained that the
unclean hands standard "gets most of its qualities in a given group of cases
from the substantive law of the particular subject."90 It then discussed two
out-of-state legal malpractice cases from Oregon and Pennsylvania arising
from criminal convictions before affirming the trial court's dismissal on
grounds of unclean hands."
The Pennsylvania case of Feld and Sons, Inc. v. Pechner, Dorfman, Wolfee,
Rounick & Cabot,"10 reviewed by the Blain court, applied a general legal
principle of in pari delicto.'o' The Oregon case of Kirkland v. Mannis,0
analyzed in Blain, used unclean hands without discussion of its application
in an action for damages."o3
97 Id. at 254-55; see also London v. Marco, 229 P2d 401, 402 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1951)
(injunction) (misleading statements made to the court constitutes unclean hands); Lazaro v.
Lazaro (In reMarriage of Lazaro), No. AIo 74 73 , 2005 WL 1332102, at *3 (Cal. Ct. App. June 6,
2005) (finding that presenting false testimony in a court proceeding in equity goes to the core
of the unclean hands doctrine). California courts have used the paradigm provided in Blain
to resolve subsequent cases involving unclean hands. See Kendall-Jackson Winery, Ltd. v.
Superior Court, 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d 743, 749 (Ct. App. 1999) ("Whether the particular misconduct
is a bar to the alleged claim for relief depends on (i) analogous case law, (2) the nature of the
misconduct, and (3) the relationship of the misconduct to the claimed injuries." (citing Blain,
272 Cal. Rptr. at 256.)).
98 Blain, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 256 (quoting Chafee II, supra note 9, at 1o91-92).
99 Id. at 256-257 (citing Kirkland v. Mannis, 639 P2d 671, 673 (Or. Ct. App. 1982); Feld
& Sons, Inc. v. Pechner, Dorfman, Wolfee, Rounick & Cabot, 458 A.2d 545, 551-52 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1983)). The Blain court found the cases persuasive, but differentiated them on the basis
that recovery may have softened the effect of the penal sanction. Id. at 258.
ioo Feld & Sons, Inc. v. Pechner, Dorfman, Wolfee, Rounick & Cabot, 458 A.2d 545 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1983).
1o Id. at 551-552 (sustaining demurrers to the bulk of compensatory and punitive dam-
ages claims for malpractice and emotional distress); see also id. at 552-55 (denying the de-
fense and allowing the action to proceed with respect to the claim for attorney fees on policy
grounds). The Pennsylvania Superior Court justified its application of inparidelicto:
Were we to aid appellants-confessed perjurers-in their attempt
to recover compensatory and punitive damages in excess of $250,ooo,
we should indeed "suffer the law to be prostituted." For we should re-
ward appellants, with a great deal of money, for their criminal conduct;
we should soften the blow of the fines and sentences imposed upon
them; and we should encourage others to believe that if they committed
crimes on their lawyers' advice, and were caught, they too might sue
their lawyers and be similarly rewarded.
Id. at 551-52 (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
102 Kirkland v. Mannis, 639 P.2d 671 (Or. Ct. App. 1982). As discussed infra notes 1o5-1i
and accompanying text, the same court later acknowledged that it had erroneously relied
solely on equity cases in applying unclean hands to a legal action. McKinley v. Weidner, 698
P.2d 983, 985 (Or. Ct. App. 1985).
103 Kirkland, 639 P.2d at 671-73. In Kirkland, a prisoner claimed malpractice against his
former criminal defense attorney because the attorney allegedly manufactured a story for his
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2. Oregon.-Oregon appellate court decisions have not all aligned with
Kirkland v. Mannis-some have reached the opposite conclusion.'" In
McKinley v. Weidner,"os the same court had a chance to reconcile Kirkland
with its prior ruling in Gratreak v. North Pacific Lumber Co.o 6
In Gratreak, decided before the distinction between law and equity had
been abolished in Oregon, the court rejected the defense of unclean hands
in a legal action.o'0 Gratreak distinguished the California Court of Appeal's
reading of the California merger in Fibreboard because it found that Oregon
law did not allow unclean hands.'" By contrast, Kirkland was arguably
defense which formed the basis of his testimony. Id. at 671-72. Based on his acknowledged
perjury, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's dismissal on the basis of unclean hands.
Id. at 673.
104 Beldt v. Leise, 60 P 3 d 1119, 1121 (Or. Ct. App. 2003) (unclean hands unavailable in
actions at law); Thompson v. Coughlin, 927 P2d 146, 148-49 (Or. Ct. App. 1996), rev'don other
grounds, 997 P.2d 191, 196 n.9 (Or. 2000); Gratreak v. N. Pac. Lumber Co., 609 P.2d 375, 378
(Or. Ct. App. 1980). Laches has also been denied in legal actions by the Supreme Court of
Oregon. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co. v. State Land Bd., 439 P.2d 575, 578 (Or. 1968) (en banc)
(declaring its decision as the "prevailing rule" and citing cases from New Jersey, Rhode Island,
Arkansas, and Michigan). See generally Roger G. Rose, Note & Comment, Equitable Defenses to
Actions at Law, 34 OR. L. REV. 55 (1954) (reviewing conflicting authority under Oregon law
regarding the application of unclean hands to legal actions).
105 McKinley, 698 P.2d at 985.
1o6 Gratreak, 6o P.2d at 378.
107 Id. at 378 n.7; see also OR. REV. STAT. § 11.020 (2oo9), repealed 1979. In Gratreak, a party
brought suit against his former employer claiming damages for tortious interference with his
employment contract with a new employer. Gratreak, 609 P.2d at 376. The employer defended
the case on the grounds that its conduct was justified under a valid restrictive covenant, id.
at 376, and presumably sought a declaratory judgment to that effect. See id. at 376-77. The
employee responded to the employer's request to declare the restrictive covenant valid by
seeking to foreclose the defense on grounds of unclean hands. Id. at 377; cf T Leigh Anenson,
Litigation Between Competitors with Mirror Restrictive Covenants: A Formula for Prosecution, 1o
STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. i, 4-8 (2oo5) (discussing UZ Eng'red Prods. Co. v. Midwest Motor
Supply Co., 770 N.E.2d io68 (Ohio Ct. App. zool), appeal not allowed, 766 N.E.2d oo2 (Ohio
2002) (precluding challenge to validity of a non-compete agreement based on the defense of
estoppel tinder a similar procedural posture)).
108 Gratreak, 609 P2d at 378; accord Ellwood v. Mid States Commodities, Inc., 404
N.W.2d 174, 184 (Iowa 1987) (denying unclean hands at law despite the anomalous result that
the same conduct may be a legal defense by another name) (citation omitted). While a statu-
tory provision allowed equitable defenses to be pled to legal actions, the Gratreak court held
that unclean hands was a "doctrine" and not a "defense" under the statute. Gratreak, 609 P.2d
at 378; see also OR. REV. STAT. § 16.46o(2) (2009), repealed 1979. The dissent disagreed. It found
textual support in the merger statute that permitted the pleading of any "equitable matter," of
which unclean hands would be included. Gratreak, 609 P.2d at 379 (Thornton, J., dissenting).
The dissent also noted the inconsistency of the majority's holding. Id. In N. Pac. Lumber Co. v.
Oliver, 596 P.2d 931, 944 (Or. 1979), the Supreme Court of Oregon barred enforcement of the
same non-compete agreement with the same employer on the basis of unclean hands under
its equitable jurisdiction. See also Anenson, supra note 3, at 492-503 (criticizing the irrational
reliance on fictional differences in legal and equitable remedies in the use of unclean hands
and noting its absurd results in these analogous Oregon cases).
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decided under the new Oregon Rules of Civil Procedure, which abolished all
procedural distinctions between law and equity.'" As such, the McKinley
court could have conciled its two former decisions had it interpreted the
new civil rules to allow unclean hands as a defense at law.' The court of
appeals, however, chose not to square its prior opinions in this manner.
Instead, it held that Kirkland's reliance on unclean hands was misplaced
and that inparidelico should have been used to reach the same result."'
The Oregon Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari to decide
the application of unclean hands in a different case, but decided the appeal
on other grounds."z
3. Maryland.-Like Oregon, the highest court in Maryland also
circumvented the issue of availability of unclean hands in legal actions. "
The intermediate appellate court in Manown v. Adams," 4 however, found
the defense applicable to an action at law despite its equitable roots.11
The plaintiff's legal action in Manown requested repayment for a
series of loans."6 Adams filed the action to recover the funds, and Manown
asserted unclean hands because Adams failed to list the transfer of assets
in his bankruptcy proceeding and divorce action."' Essentially, Manown
claimed that Adams "defrauded both his wife and his creditors by hiding
assets" in Manown's name and "perjured himself in the process.""' Adams
did not contest Manown's allegations, but instead asserted that unclean
hands was immaterial in an action at law."9
The the trial and appellate courts disagreed.' The appellate court
1o9 McKinley, 698 P.2d at 985; see also OR. R. Civ. P. 2: "There shall be one form of action
known as a civil action. All procedural distinctions between actions at law and suits in equity
are hereby abolished, except for those distinctions specifically provided for by these rules, by
statute, or by the Constitution of this state."
i lo McKinley, 698 P.2d at 985.
iii Id. at 985-86.
1 12 Thompson v. Coughlin, 997 P.2d 191, 196 n.9 (Or. 2000).
113 Adams v. Manown, 615 A.2d 61I, 617 (Md. 1992).
114 Manown v. Adams, 598 A.2d 821 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991), rev'don other grounds, 615
A.2d 6i 1, 612 (Md. 1992).
115 Id. at 825-2 7.
i16 Id. at 823.
117 Id. One of the alleged loans included down payment on a house that Adams also did
not claim any interest in his bankruptcy schedule. Id.
II8 Id. at 825.
119 Id. at 824.
izo Id. at 825. While the appellate court accepted the trial court's ruling that unclean
hands was applicable in the case, it ultimately reversed because it found the trial court erred
in giving the issue of unclean hands to the jury. Id. at 826; cf Unilogic, Inc. v. Burroughs Corp.,
12 Cal. Rptr. 2d 741, 746-47 (Ct. App. 1992) (trial court did not err in having jury consider
unclean hands defense when legal claim and equitable defense involved interrelated facts).
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emphasized that unclean hands served to protect the court and to suppress
illegal and fraudulent transactions.' The court then found such purposes
to be furthered by the application of unclean hands in the case at bar.12 2 It
also relied on two cases from the high court in Maryland that applied the
legal defense of in pari delicto as authority for the rule that unclean hands
may be invoked to bar suits "at law and in equity."' The appellate court
reasoned that "in pari delicto is merely a cognate principle to the unclean
hands doctrine," which justified the analogy. 2 4 The court additionally held
that the "general trend" of merging procedures at law and equity supported
its decision. 2 1
As discussed previously, the Maryland Court of Appeals 2 6 eschewed
making a decision on the basis of the "clean hands" doctrine on further
appeal and found instead that the bankruptcy trustee was the real party
in interest.'"2 The dissent criticized the unannounced shifting of doctrinal
121 Manown, 598 A.2d at 824-25.
122 Id. at 827. The court described court protection as "the idea being that judicial in-
tegrity is endangered when judicial powers are interposed to aid persons whose very presence
before a court is the result of some fraud or inequity." Id. at 824 (citing Niner v. Hanson, 142
A.2d 798, 803 (Md. 1958)); see also WinMark Ltd. P'ship v. Miles & Stockbridge, 693 A.2d 824,
830 (Md. 1997) ("The clean hands doctrine is not applied for the protection of the parties nor
as a punishment to the wrongdoer; rather, the doctrine is intended to protect the courts from
having to endorse or reward inequitable conduct." (quoting Adams v. Manown, 615 A.2d 61 1,
6 16 (Md. 1992) (internal quotation marks omitted))). The appellate court also determined that
deterring fraud is best accomplished by leaving the parties without remedy against each other.
Manown, 598 A.2d at 825 ("The suppression of such illegal and fraudulent transactions is far
more likely, in general, to be accomplished by leaving the parties without remedy against each
other, and thus introducing a preventative check, than by enforcing them at the instance of
one of the parties to the fraud." (quoting Roman v. Mali, 42 Md. 513, 533-34 (1875) (alteration
in original)); Bland v. Larsen, 627 A.2d 79, 85 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1993) (quoting Manown, 598
A.2d at 821).
123 Manown, 598 A.2d at 825 (citing Messick v. Smith, 69 A.2d 478 (Md. 1949); Shirks
Motor Express Corp. v. Forster Transfer & Rigging Co., 133 A.2d 59 (Md. 1957)).
124 Manown, 598 A.2d at 826 n.6. ButseeAdams, 615 A.2d at 623 (Chasanow, J., concurring
and dissenting) (finding the similarities between the defenses not sufficient to invoke un-
clean hands); accordTruitt v. Miller, 407 A.2d 1073, 1079-40 (D.C. 1979) (denying clean hands
defense in action at law despite noting its similarity to in pari delicro); Ellwood v. Mid States
Commodities, Inc., 404 N.W.2d 174, 184 (Iowa 1987) (citation omitted).
125 Manown, 598 A.2d at 825-26 (citing MD. R. Civ. P. 2-301). Relying in part on concerns
over a jury trial, another Maryland appellate court had a contrary interpretation of the proce-
dural unification and found that laches may not be raised as a defense to a legal claim. Smith
v. Gehring, 496 A.2d 317,322-23 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985) (distinguishing between equitable
affirmative relief and purely equitable defenses and holding that the procedural rules merging
law and equity "do not extend to the elimination of distinctions between what defenses may
be available to a legal claim as opposed to an equitable claim").
126 Like New York, Maryland's court of last resort is called the "Court of Appeals."
127 Adams, 615 A.2d at 617-18; accord Universal Builders, Inc. v. Moon Motor Lodge,
Inc., 244 A.2d 10, 14 (Pa. 1968) (refusing to apply unclean hands in part because it would pe-
nalize innocent creditors in bankruptcy). The Court of Appeals of Maryland, in Winmark Ltd.
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focus. 12 8 These justices opined that the code merger was procedural only.' 9
Referencing pre-merger precedent from Maryland and the United States
Supreme Court, the dissent concluded that unclean hands applies only in
equity.130
4. New York.-Similar to the Maryland intermediate appellate decision of
Manown v. Adams, two courts applying New York law found unclean hands
applicable to legal relief by reference to the defense of in pari delicto.13 1
In Smith v. Long,132 a New York appellate court allowed the defense of
unclean hands to a legal claim when the plaintiffs attempted to perpetrate a
fraud on the government. 1 The plaintiffs sought damages for the failure to
transfer stock under a buy-back agreement arising out of the formation of a
corporation gone awry.134 The plaintiffs had transferred their stock to one of
the defendants after the Small Business Administration (SBA) denied their
application for a minority business enterprise, due in part to their ownership
percentages.' 3 The defendants asserted the claim should be barred under
Partnership & Miles v. Stockbridge, characterized the dilemma it had faced in Adams:
Indeed, there, liability of the defendant in the civil action to the
discharged bankrupt had been determined by judgment. To the extent
that the judgment was collectible, extinguishing it by applying the clean
hands doctrine would have resulted in a windfall to the judgment debtor
and would have deprived the bankrupt's creditors of an asset from which
they should have benefited.
WinAlark, 693 A.2d at 830. The court could have found unclean hands applied at law but found
the perjury unrelated to the claim or not supported by policy reasons. Id. at 831.
128 Adams, 615 A.2d at 621 (Chasanow, J., concurring and dissenting).
129 Id. at 623.
130 Id.
131 Mallis v. Bankers Trust Co., 615 E2d 68, 75 (2d Cir. 1980); see Smith v. Long, 723
N.Y.S.2d 584, 586-87 (App. Div. 2001).
132 Smith, 723 N.Y.S.2d at 587.
133 Id. at 587.
134 Id. The plaintiffs sought specific performance and damages, which raised the ques-
tion of whether the court considered its power to invoke unclean hands a matter of resolv-
ing the requested legal relief under the equitable clean-up doctrine. Id. See generally A. Leo
Levin, Equitable Clean-Up and the Jury: A Suggested Orientation, 1oo U. PA. L. REv. 320 (1951);
John E. Sanchez, Jury Trials in Hybrid and Non-HybridActions: The Equitable Clean-Up Doctrine
in the Guise of Inseparability and Other Analytical Problems, 38 DEPAUL L. REV. 627 (1989). See also
Anenson, supra note 6, at 416-17 (discussing the practice of equity courts "cleaning up" any
remaining legal issues is a remnant of the split system which enabled chancellors to provide
complete relief and avoid a multiplicity of actions). Other cases that appear to allow unclean
hands at law concerned both legal and equitable relief. See Big Lots Stores, Inc. v. Jaredco,
Inc., 182 F. Supp. 2d 644, 652 (S.D. Ohio 2002); Urecal Corp. v. Masters, 413 F. Supp. 873, 876
(N.D. 1I. 1976).




the doctrine of unclean hands because the plaintiffs had perpetrated a
fraud on the SBA.13 6 In reversing summary judgment for the plaintiff, the
intermediate court of appeals declared that unclean hands was available in
"law or equity."' Because the parties were allegedly accomplices in the
same scheme, the court then defined the defense according to the parallel
legal defense in pari delicto.'3 Subsequent decisions rendered under New
York law have followed Smith and barred legal claims on the basis of unclean
hands without discussion of the application issue. 139
Applying New York law before the decision in Smith and its progeny, 140
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals also considered unclean hands to bar
claims for legal relief when the parties engaged in illegal activities. 141In
Mallis v. Bankers Trust Co., 142 the plaintiffs brought an action under state
and federal law to recover losses suffered from advancing money for the
purchase of securities as a result of alleged misrepresentations by the de-
fendant. 143 The defendant claimed that the plaintiffs also violated various
state and federal laws in the securities transaction.1 " While ultimately re-
versing the lower court's decision in favor of the defendant, the court of
appeals considered the defense of unclean hands against the pendant state
common law claims of fraud and negligent misrepresentation.145 It used
the term in pan delicto in considering whether the same conduct barred
the federal securities law claim." Perhaps because the court equated the
136 Id.
137 Id. (The appellate court held there was an issue of fact whether one of the plaintiffs
executed the agreement to perpetrate a fraud on the SBA).
138 Id. ("The unclean hands doctrine rests on the premise that one cannot prevail in
an action to enforce an agreement where the basis of the action is immoral and one to which
equity will not lend its aid.") (internal citations omitted).
139 See Craig v. Bank of N.Y., 169 E Supp. 2d 202, 210 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (holding un-
clean hands bars breach of fiduciary duty and breach of contract claims under New York law);
Bistricer v. Bistricer, 659 F Supp. 215, 217 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) (indicating that unclean hands
is available in legal action alleging breach of contract and fraud and noting that "[bloth par-
ties have treated the defense as applying to the claims under New York law"); see also Welch
v. DiBlasi, 737 N.Y.S.2d 716, 717 (App. Div. 200) (finding insufficient evidence of unclean
hands without discussing its applicability due to the nature of the requested relief).
14o As discussed supra note 62, federal courts sitting in diversity jurisdiction are in con-
flict concerning whether unclean hands is a matter of state or federal law.
141 See Mallis v. Bankers Trust Co., 615 Fzd 68, 75-76 (2d Cir. 1980).
142 Mallis, 615 F.2d 68.
143 Id. at 71.
144 Id. at 75. The defendant claimed that the plaintiff's agreement to advance funds for
the purchase of securities violated the state statute prohibiting usury. Id. The defendant ad-
ditionally asserted that the plaintiff falsely characterized the purpose of the loan in violation
of federal law. Id.
145 Id. at 75-76.
146 Id. The court ultimately found insufficient evidence of the defense and reversed the
trial court because the plaintiffs' alleged unclean conduct had no connection to the subject
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two defenses,147 it did not address the applicability of unclean hands to
legal remedies and cited as support only cases applying the doctrine to bar
equitable relief.14 8
In contrast to Smith and Mallis, other New York courts have rejected
unclean hands as a defense in actions at law.149 Thus, akin to Oregon,5 0
New York cases are divided on the legal incorporation of unclean hands
after the merger."'
5. Michigan.-Rather than ruling the merger allows the universal use of
unclean hands in legal and equitable remedies like some of the cases
described above, Michigan courts have created an exception to the rule that
unclean hands is inapplicable to legal claims in order to protect the judicial
process.' Put simply, regardless of the relief requested, Michigan allows
unclean hands on the basis of litigation misconduct in the case before the
court.'s In contrast to the Maryland case ofAdamsv. Manown, the California
case of Blain v. Doctor's Co. (both involving perjury in previous litigation),' "
and the New York case of Smith v. Long(concerning other conduct possibly
matter of the litigation, did not cause injury, and was not equal in guilt to the defendant. Id.
at 75.
147 See Furman v. Furman, 34 N.Y.S.2d 699, 704 (Spec. Term 1941) (deciding res judicata
bars subsequent legal action based upon adjudication of unclean hands in prior equity suit
because unclean hands has element of equal guilt and corresponds to in pari delicto defense
at law), aff'd, 3o N.YS.2d 516 (App. Div. 1941), aff'd, 4o N.E.2d 643 (N.Y. 1942). For cases
differentiating unclean hands and in pai delicto, see infra note 312.
148 Alallis, 615 F.2d at 75.
149 See, e.g., Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Aniero Concrete Co., 404 F 3 d 566, 607 (2d Cir.
2005) (applying New York law) ("Unclean hands is an equitable defense to equitable claims.
Because [defendant-counter claimant] seeks damages in an action at law, Aetna cannot avail
itself of unclean hands as a defense." (internal citations omitted)); W Alton Jones Found. v.
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. (In re Gulf Oil/Cities Serv. Tender Offer Litig.), 725 F. Supp. 712, 742
(S.D.N.Y. 1989) (applying New York law); Manshion Joho Ctr. Co. v. Manshion Joho Ctr.,
Inc., 8o6 N.Y.S.2d 480, 482 (App. Div. 2oo5) ("The doctrine of unclean hands is an equitable
defense that is unavailable in an action exclusively for damages." (citing Hasbro Bradley,
Inc. v. Coopers & Lybrand, 515 N.Y.S.2d 461, 463 (App. Div. 1987))); Pecorella v. Greater
Buffalo Press, Inc., 486 N.Y.S.2d 562,563 (App. Div. 1985); Morrisania II Assocs. v. Harvey, 527
N.Y.S.2d 954, 961 (Civ. Ct. 1988).
150 See discussion supra Part II.A.2.
151 Even after the Field Code's abolishment of the distinction between actions at law
and suits in equity, which precipitated the merger in other states and eventually the federal
system, the courts of New York "returned to enforcing a distinction between law and equity in
the pleadings." Ellen E. Sward, A History of the Civil Trial in the United States, 51 U. KAN. L. REV.
347, 385 (2003). For discussion of the Field Code's abolishment of the distinction between
actions at law and suits in equity, see Stephen N. Subrin, David Dudley Fieldandtke Field Code:
A Historical Analysis of an Earlier Procedural Vision, 6 LAW & HisT. REV. 31 1, 328-38 (1988).
152 See, e.g., Maldonado v. Ford Motor Co., 719 N.W.2d 809, 818 (Mich. 2oo6).
153 Id.
154 Blain v. Doctor's Co., 272 Cal. Rptr. 250, 251 (Ct. App. 1990).
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intended to defraud a government body),'"' Michigan's accommodation for
unclean hands in damages actions is more closely connected to the court
protection purpose of the defense.'"' In fact, Michigan courts have justified
the departure from precedent precluding unclean hands in legal actions
under their inherent authority."
In Cummingsv. Wayne County,'" a personal injury case in which monetary
damages were sought, the trial court dismissed the action because the
plaintiff attempted "to extort favorable evidence by death threats"
and resorted to vandalism during the trial.'59 Finding that such flagrant
misconduct of witness-tampering posed a danger to the judicial process,
the trial court found it had inherent authority to dismiss under the doctrine
of unclean hands.' 60 The appellate court agreed.' 6'
It distinguished a prior decision that denied unclean hands in actions
at law for the reason that substantive distinctions survived the procedural
merger.162 Citing Buchanan Home & Auto Supply Co. v. Firestone Tire &
Rubber Co.,' 61 the appellate court declared: "we do not believe that the
[substantive-procedural] distinction prevents a court of law from invoking
the 'clean hands doctrine' when litigant misconduct constitutes an abuse
of the judicial process itself and not just a matter of inequity between
the parties."" The court emphasized that the doctrine of unclean hands
"applies not only for the protection of the parties but also for the protection
155 Smith v. Long, 723 N.Y.S.2d 584,586-87 (App. Div. 2001).
i56 SeeAnenson, Process-Based Theory of Unclean Hands, supra note 4, at 542-57 (proposing
four-phase procedural analysis for the legal incorporation of unclean hands by examining cases
predicating the defense on ) "misconduct in the present litigation that potentially interferes
with the process," id. at 543; 2) "misconduct outside the present litigation that potentially
interferes with the process," id. at 546; 3) "misconduct in prior litigation with no potential
to interfere with the process," id. at 548; and, finally, 4) "nonlitigation misconduct with no
potential to interfere with the process," id at 553).
157 See, e.g., Maldonado, 719 N.W.2d at 818; Cummings v. Wayne Cnty., 533 N.W.2d 13,
14 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995).
158 Cummings, 533 N.W.2d 13-
159 Id. at 13-15.
16o Id at 14.-
161 Id. (reviewing trial court dismissal under an abuse of discretion standard); see also id.
(noting the civil rules permitting the court to dismiss an action for lack of progress and for
discovery abuses).
162 Id (citing Clarke v. Brunswick Corp., 211 N.W.2d 101, 102-03 (Mich. Ct. App. 1973)
(denying both estoppel and unclean hands); cf Grigg v. Robinson Furniture Co., 260 N.WA2d
898, 903 (Mich. Ct. App. 1977) ("At least since 1963, equitable and legal claims may be joined
in a common complaint and equitable defenses can defeat legal claims.") (discussing the
application of a different equitable defense).
163 Buchanan Home & Auto Supply Co. v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 544 F Supp.
242 (D.S.C. 1981). Buchanan Home applied unclean hands as a matter of federal law and is
discussed infra Part II.B.2.
164 Cummings, 533 N.W.2d at 14.
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of the court." 6 s
The court then quoted from Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire
Co.,166 in which the United States Supreme Court invoked the historic power
of equity to set aside a fraudulently begotten judgment:167 "Tampering
with the administration of justice ... is a wrong against the institutions set
up to protect and safeguard the public, institutions in which fraud cannot
complacently be tolerated consistently with the good order of society." 168
The majority opinion in Hazel-Atlas Glass did not discuss "unclean hands"
as such,'6 ' but the ruling emphasized the same fundamental purpose of the
doctrine by refusing to aid a litigant who had perpetrated "a deliberately
planned and carefully executed scheme to defraud not only the Patent
Office but the Circuit Court ofAppeals."7 o In Cummings, the Michigan Court
of Appeals also cited to Precision Instrument Manufacturing Co. v. Automotive
MaintenanceMachinery Co.,"' a post-Hazel-Atlas Glass decision of the United
States Supreme Court that specifically applied the doctrine of unclean
hands to a suit in equity involving perjury in the patent process."'
The Cummings decision has been followed in other appellate cases in
165 Id. (citing Buchanan Home, 544 E Supp. at 244).
166 Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 246 (1944), overruled on
othergrounds by Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 429 U.S. 17, 18 (1976).
167 Id. at 245 (explaining the facts before noting that the fraud "demands the exercise of
the historic power of equity to set aside fraudulently begotten judgments").
168 Cummings, 533 N.W.2d at 14 (quoting Hazel-Atlas Glass, 322 U.S. at 246). For a discus-
sion of the Hazel-Atlas Glass decision, see Eugene R. Anderson & Nadia V. Holober, Preventing
Inconsistencies in Litigation with a Spotlight on Insurance Coverage Litigation: The Doctrines ofJudicial
Estoppel, Equitable Estoppel, Quasi-Estoppel, Collateral Estoppel, "Afend the Hold," "Fraud on the
Court" and Judicial and Evidentiary Admissions, 4 CONN. INs. L.J. 589, 703-05 (998).
169 See Anenson, Process-Based Theory of Unclean Hands, supra note 4, at 570 n.266 (noting
that the Hazel-Atlas Glass decision is the seminal case for the doctrine of "fraud on the court").
Ironically, because the circumstances suggested that Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. knew about the
fraud and benefited from it, the three dissenting Justices raised the issue of unclean hands
and preferred to have the district court resolve the dispute. Hazel-Atlas Glass Co, 322 U.S. at
260-61, 270 (Roberts, J., dissenting); see also id. at 271 (Chief Justice Stone concurring with
the dissent's conclusion).
170 Hazel-Atlas Glass, 322 U.S. at 245 (emphasizing that the fraud concerned more than
the litigants). Hartford-Empire had manufactured evidence to obtain approval of a patent and
prove its subsequent infringement. Id. at 240-41.
171 Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 8o6 (1945).
172 Cummings v. Wayne Cnty., 533 N.W.2d 13, 14 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995) (citing Precision
Instrument Alfg., 324 U.S. at 814-15). The unclean hands case of Precision Instrument Mfg. relied
on the fraud on the court case of Hazel-Atlas Glass. The Court in Precision InstrumentMfg. con-
cluded that the application of unclean hands was justified because "[o]nly in that way can the
Patent Office and the public escape from being classed among the 'mute and helpless victims
of deception and fraud."' Id. at 818 (quoting Hazel-Atlas Glass, 322 U.S. at 246). The appel-
late court in Cummings also relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Roadway Express, Inc. v.
Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764-65 (1980), which recognized the inherent power of courts to sanction
litigation misconduct. Cummings, 533 N.W.zd at 14.
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Michigan.' In fact, Cummings was recently cited with approval by the
Michigan Supreme Court in Maldonado v. Ford Motor Co.1' The Maldonado
court upheld the dismissal of a legal action alleging employment
discrimination based on a party and her counsel's pretrial publicity of
evidence intended to taint the jury pool.' Quoting Cummings, the Michigan
Supreme Court announced the universal applicability of unclean hands
based on litigation misconduct:
The authority to dismiss a lawsuit for litigant misconduct is a creature of the
clean hands doctrine and, despite its origins, is applicable to both equitable
and legal damages claims. The authority is rooted in a court's fundamental
interest in protecting its own integrity and that of the judicial process. The
clean hands doctrine applies not only for the protection of the parties but
also for the protection of the court.7 6
The Michigan Supreme Court rooted the trial court's dismissal power in its
judicial authority under the state constitution."'
6. Connecticut.-Unlike Michigan, the applicability of unclean hands to
legal claims in Connecticut does not have the sanction of the state supreme
court. Nevertheless, three cases from its trial courts declared unclean hands
available in actions at law and denied motions to strike the defense."'
173 See Bygrave v. Van Reken, No. 218048, 2001 WL 672375, at #2 (Mich. Ct. App. May
4, 2001) (extending Cummings to include monetary sanctions, not just dismissal); Beagle v.
Gen. Motors Corp., No. 245519, 2004 WL 2480484, at *1 (Mich. Ct.App. Nov 4, 2004) (same);
Prince v. MacDonald, 602 N.W.2d 834, 836 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999) (extending the Cummings
line of precedent without mentioning "unclean hands" for filing bad faith bankruptcy petition
to delay proceedings).
174 Maldonado v. Ford Motor Co., 719 N.W.2d 809, 818 (Mich. 2oo6); see also id. at 816
n.15. Contra Russell v. Casebolt, 348 S.W.2d 548, 553 (Mo. 1964) (refusing to recognize un-
clean hands in a damages action and reversing trial court dismissal based on perjury).
175 Maldonado, 719 N.W.2d at 826. The plaintiff and her counsel had repeatedly publi-
cized evidence ruled inadmissible at trial. Id. at 81 1-16. The decision in Maldonado was 4-3.
The three dissenting judges found the dismissal of the case violated the plaintiffs right to
free speech. Id. at 826-37 (Cavanagh, J., dissenting) (Weaver and Kelly, JJ., concurring in dis-
sent). One of the judges in a separate dissent also found there was no legal foundation for the
dismissal. Id. at 837 (Weaver, J., dissenting).
176 Id. at 818 (citations and quotation marks omitted).
177 Id. at 818-19; id. at 81o. Consistent with Maldonado, courts around the country have
remedied various kinds of litigation misconduct regardless of the relief requested under the
doctrine of "fraud on the court." See Kupferman v. Consul. Research & Mfg. Corp., 459 F.2d
1072, 1074 n.i (2d Cir. 1972); Sun World, Inc. v. Lizarazu Olivarria, 144 ER.D. 384, 389-90
(E.D. Cal. 1992); see also Lazaro v. Lazaro (In re Marriage of Lazaro), No. Alo 7 473 , 2005 WL
13321o2, at *3 (Cal. Ct. App. June 6, 2005) (indicating fraud on the court is unclean hands
(citing Katz v. Karlsson, 191 P.2d 541, 544-45 (Cal. Ct. App. 1948) (fraud on the court))). Use
of this doctrine obviates the need to address the effect of the consolidation of law and equity
procedures on the defense of unclean hands.
178 First Fairfield Funding, L.L.C. v. Goldman, No. CV020 4 65 79 9 S, 2003 WL 22708882,
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Comparable to the intermediate appellate courts in California,179 the
Connecticut trial courts relied on the broad language of a case from their
supreme court and declared it "well settled that equitable defenses or
claims may be raised in an action at law."18 0
The attitude of the Connecticut courts also correlates to that of the
California judiciary."' Rather than requiring the party asserting unclean
hands to find cases applying the doctrine to damages, for instance, the court
in First Fairfield Funding'5 8 placed the burden of case production on the
party seeking to deny the defense.8 3 In accepting the defense to ban legal
claims for tortious interference with contract and unfair trade practices, the
court reasoned:
In support of its first claim, the plaintiff cites a number of cases which
stand for the proposition that the defense of unclean hands is available as a
at * 1-2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 3,2003); Robarge v. Patriot Gen. Ins. Co., No. CV- 9 1-03932 IS,
1991 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2793, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec.4, 1991); Jesperson v. Ponichtera,
No. CV88 oo96615 S, 19 9 0WL 283884, at *I-2, (Conn. Super. Ct. Jul. 16, 1990); accord Liberty
Bank v. Holloway, No. CV92-0703852 S, 1993 WL 408314, at #1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 28,
1993) (citing Jesperson) (laches).
179 See Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. E. Bay Union of Machinists, Local 1304, 39 Cal.
Rptr. 64, 97 (Dist. Ct. App. 1964); see supra note 75.
18o First Fairfield Funding, 2003 WL 22708882, at *I (quoting Kerin v. Udolf, 334 A.2d
434,437 (Conn. 1973)) (granting equitable relief to the defendant who claimed to have depos-
ited the money in the mail in suit for default on a note); Robarge, 1991 Conn. Super. LEXIS,
at *3; see also. Hubley Mfg. & Supply Co. v. Ives, 70 A. 615, 616 (Conn. 1908) (arguing that the
"fundamental purpose" of the Practice Act of 1879 was so that "legal and equitable rights of
the parties may be enforced and protected in one action"); cf. Thompson v. Orcutt, 777 A.2d
670, 676, 681 (Conn. 2001) (reversing appellate court finding that unclean hands was inappli-
cable on an action to foreclose a mortgage which the court noted was an "equitable proceed-
ing"); Samasko v. Davis, 64 A.2d 682, 685 (Conn. 1949) ("Where a plaintiff's [equitable] claim
'grows out of or depends upon or is inseparably connected with his own prior fraud, a court
of equity will, in general, deny him any relief, and will leave him to whatever remedies and
defenses at law he may have."' (quoting Gest v. Gest, 167 A. 909, 912 (Conn. 1933))).
Jesperson was a shareholder derivative action alleging wrongful conversion and breach of
fiduciary duty by an officer and director who asserted the defense of unclean hands of the
shareholders by participating in and benefitting from any wrongdoing. Jesperson, 1990 WL
283884, at *I. The Jesperson court cited Grigg v. Robinson Furniture Co., 260 N.W.2d 898, 903
(Mich. Ct. App. 1977) ("equitable defenses can defeat legal claims"), as persuasive author-
ity for the proposition that equitable defenses may defeat legal claims. Jesperson, 199o WL
283884, at * I. Grigg, like Kerin, did not involve the defense of unclean hands. Grigg, 26o N.W.2d
at 903. Two federal district court cases from Connecticut cited by the Jesperson court neither
discussed the adoption question nor found that the proof offered sustained the defense. See
Matthies v. Seymour Mfg. Co., 23 F.R.D. 64, 93-96 (D. Conn. 1958) (applying Connecticut
law), revd on other grounds, Matthies v. Seymour Mfg. Co., 270 F.2d 365, 375 (2d Cit. 1959);
Burndy Corp. v. Teledyne Indus., Inc., 584 F. Supp. 656,663 (D. Conn. 1984).
181 See, e.g., Unilogic, Inc. v. Burroughs Corp., 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d 741, 744-45 (Ct. App.
1992); see also supra notes 86-93 and accompanying text.
182 First Fairfield Funding, zoo3 WL 22708882.
183 See id. at*1.
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defense in action[s] seeking equitable relief. What the cases relied upon by
the plaintiff do not say, however, is that the defense of unclean hands is not
available in actions at law."
It further justified its decision on the basis that "[t]he integrity of the
court is no less worthy of protection in action[s] at law, than in actions
in equity."'"' Accordingly, the court put policy over pedigree when no
precedent precluded the universal application of unclean hands.'"'
7. Rhode Island.-Like Connecticut, a Rhode Island opinion allowing
unclean hands to be pled against legal claims occurred at the trial level.'"
Matching other state courts incorporating the defense into the law,'" the
ruling relied on the federal district court decision in Buchanan Home'" as
persuasive authority.'o
The Rhode Island Superior Court decision in Bartlett v. Dunne"' found
that perjury warranted dismissal of a negligence claim for damages pursuant
to unclean hands.' During the trial, plaintiff lied under oath regarding his
alcohol consumption prior to accident."' Because the court found that the
"[p]laintiff's deception [wals willful and [struck] at the very heart of the
judiciary," it determined that a finding of contempt was insufficient and
instead invoked unclean hands to dismiss the action.1
9 4
B. Federal Court Adoption of Unclean Hands
Federal courts have applied unclean hands to legal actions as a matter
of federal law in both federal question and diversity cases.195 As in state
184 Id. (citations omitted) (third-party defendant alleging unclean hands on the part of
the plaintiff in connection with the plaintiffs initial acquisition of a contract).
185 Id. at *2.
i86 See id.
187 Bartlett v. Dunne, No. C.A. 89-3051, 1989 WL 1110258, at #3 (R.I. Super. Ct. Nov.
1o, 1989).
188 See, e.g., Cummings v. Wayne Cnty., 533 N.W2d 13, 14 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995) (citing
Buchanan Home & Auto Supply Co. v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 544 F Supp. 242, 244-45
(D.S.C. i981).
189 Buchanan Home, 544 F. Supp. at 244-45.
i90 Bartlett, 19 89 WL 11 10258, at *3.
191 Id. at *1-3.
192 Id. at *3; accord Smith v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 124 F.R.D. 1o3, 105-07 (D. Md. 1989)
(pretrial perjury subject to unclean hands). For a discussion of Smith, see infra notes 234-37
and accompanying text.
193 Bartlett, 19 89 WL II 10258, at* 2.
194 Id. at *3 (discussing alternative sanction of contempt).
195 Supra note 62 (discussing federal courts with diversity jurisdiction using a federal
law of unclean hands without the benefit of an Erie analysis). Some courts are not clear upon
which law (federal or state) they rely on to apply and/or define unclean hands. For instance,
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court jurisprudence,96 some of the courts applied the defense without
consideration of its application at law.197 The following discussion analyzes
federal courts of appeal and district court decisions from the Eleventh,
Fourth, Ninth, Seventh, Sixth, and Fifth Circuits.
1. Eleventh Circuit.-The most recent decision considering the applicability
of unclean hands at law comes from the Eleventh Circuit. In Boca Raton
Community Hospital, Inc. v. Tenet Healthcare Corp.,19 8 the District Court for
the Southern District of Florida denied the plaintiffs renewed motion for
class certification due in part to the potential availability of unclean hands
as a defense to legal relief.19
Boca sued Tenet for federal civil RICO violations due to its charging
practices.2 * Tenet claimed unclean hands based on Boca's own charging
practices. 01 In concluding that the viability of "Tenet's unclean hands
defense [was] more than a mere possibility," thus justifying an order to
deny class certification, the district court reviewed recent decisions from
the Eleventh Circuit.02 "Although not definitive," the district court found
that "the Eleventh Circuit's . . . pronouncements on this issue in Sikes v.
Teleline, Inc., and Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of PSA, Inc. v.
Edwards2 indicate[d] that it would be receptive to Tenet's argument." 05
The court noted that "[i]n Sikes, the Eleventh Circuit suggested that civil
a New York district court sitting in diversity in Gala Jewelry, Inc. v. Harming appears to follow
federal law. It declared that "the law of this circuit restricts the 'unclean hands' doctrine to
suits in equity, thereby categorically defeating defendant's attempted defense in this suit
at law." Gala Jewelry, Inc. v. Harring, No. 05 Civ 7713(GEL), 2006 WL 3734202, at *2 n-3
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 18, 2oo6) (citing Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Aniero Concrete Co., 404 F 3 d 566
(2d Cir. 2005)). However, the Aetna decision actually applied New York law to determine the
applicability of unclean hands to actions at law. See Aetna Cas. & Sar Co., 404 E3 d at 6o7.The
court also cited a federal decision from the U.S. Supreme Court. Id. (citing Keystone Driller
Co. v. Gen. Excavator CO., 290 U.S. 240, 245-46 (933)).
196 See Mallis v. Bankers Trust Co., 615 E2d 68, 75 (2d Cir. 1980) (applying New York
law) (holding the defense inapplicable because plaintiffs' supposed misconduct was not suf-
ficiently connected with the subject of litigation); Blain v. Doctor's Co., 272 Cal. Rptr. 250, 255
(Ct.App. 1990); Kirkland v. Mannis, 639 P2d 671, 671-73 (Or. Ct. App. 1982).
197 See, e.g., Big Lots Stores, Inc. v. Jaredco, Inc., 182 F. Supp. 2d 644, 652 (S.D. Ohio
2002).
198 Boca Raton Cmty. Hosp., Inc. v. Tenet Healthcare Corp., 238 ER.D. 679 (S.D. Fla.
2oo6).
199 Id. at 694.
200 Id. at 691.
201 Id. at 692.
202 Id. at 694.
203 Sikes v. Teleline, Inc., 281 E3d 1350, 1366 n.41 (i ith Cir. 2002).
204 Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of PSA, Inc. v. Edwards, 437 F3 d 1145, 1148
(2006).
205 Boca Raton Gmty. Hosp., 238 F.R.D. at 693 (internal citations omitted).
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RICO claims based on illegal gambling were rare because 'plaintiffs may
be barred from bringing such a claim by the "unclean hands" doctrine."'" 0
Moreover, citing a decision that applied the defense of in pari delicto
(corresponding to rulings from the courts of Maryland and New York), the
district court relied on Edwards, wherein the Eleventh Circuit held that
this related legal defense applies in civil RICO actions. 07 Furthermore,
(similar to the rationale of the lower courts in California and Connecticut),
the district court dismissed Boca's argument that the "Eleventh Circuit has
never found the availability of [an unclean hands] defense to a civil RICO
claim," with the rejoinder that "it is equally clear that the Eleventh Circuit
has not held otherwise." 0 In light of the foregoing, the court ruled unclean
hands a viable defense to a civil RICO claim for damages. 0
2. Fourth Circuit.-The most widely-cited opinion of unclean hands as a
viable defense at law is Buchanan Home.210 Sitting in diversity, the District
Court for the District of South Carolina applied the doctrine to defeat
claimed damages for warranty, tort, and contract violations.' A dealership
206 Id. (quoting Sikes, 281 F.3 d at 1366 n.41).
207 Id. (citing Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors, 437 F.3 d. at 1155-56); see also Mallis
v. Bankers Trust Co., 615 F.2d 68, 75-76 (2d Cir. 1980) (finding unclean hands to bar legal
relief for state law claims and considering in pari delicto to bar the same conduct under the
federal securities law claim); Manown v. Adams, 598 A.2d 821, 825-26 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1991), rev'don other grounds, 615 A.2d 61 1,612 (Md. 1992) (relying on inparidelicto to justify
the application of unclean hands); Smith v. Long, 723 N.Y.S.2d 584, 586-87 (App. Div. 2oo1)
(using in pari delicto interchangeably with unclean hands without discussion of any difference
between them).
208 Boca Raton Cmty. Hosp., 238 F.R. D. at 693 (alteration in original); see also Unilogic, Inc.
v. Burroughs Corp., 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d 741, 745 (Ct. App. 1992); First Fairfield Funding, L.L.C. v.
Goldman, No. CV020 4 65 7 99S, 2003 WL 22708882, at * (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 3, 2003).
2o9 Boca Raton Cmty. Hosp., 238 ER.D at 694.
21o Buchanan Home & Auto Supply Co. v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 544 F Supp.
242 (D.S.C. 1981). Cases citing Buchanan Home include Cummings v. Wayne County, 533 N.W.2d
13, 14 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995) and Bartlett v. Dunne, No. C.A. 89-3051, 1989 WL II 10258, at *3
(R.I. Super. Ct. Nov. 1o, 1989).
21 1 Buchanan Home, 544 F. Supp. at 245. The Buchanan Home opinion was authored by
Judge Robert F. Chapman, who is now a Circuit Judge on the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals.
Despite diversity jurisdiction, the district court cited several federal decisions for the proposi-
tion that unclean hands applies to bar legal relief. See id. at 245-47. Thus, while it did not ad-
dress the choice of law issue, the district court viewed the question of application as a matter
of federal procedural law under the Erie Doctrine.
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals relied on Maryland law to define unclean hands in
a diversity action between business partners. See Lyon v. Campbell, No. 99-2455, 2000 WL
991650, at *3 (4th Cir. July 19, 2000) (per curiam) (reversing trial court's application of unclean
hands for failing to disclose a conflict of interest in the potential sale as not sufficiently related
to the breach of fiduciary duty claim to warrant application of the doctrine (citing Bland v.
Larsen, 627 A.2d 79, 85 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1993); Manown v. Adams, 598 A.2d 821 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 1991), rev'don other grounds, 615 A.2d 6ii, 612 (Md. 1992))) (first appeal); Lyon
v. Campbell, 33 Fed. App'x 659, 665 (4th Cir. 2002) (affirming trial court decision to impose
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sued Firestone for damages associated with customer dissatisfaction with
defects in a brand of its tires. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that "it did not
receive sufficient compensation for replacing and adjusting unserviceable
Firestone 500 radial tires" under the terms of its dealership agreement.2
Firestone paid the dealer "a handling fee for each tire replaced and
adjusted" to account for its time replacing and adjusting tires."' The
dealer also received "billing credit" as reimbursement for the cost of the
replacement tire taken from its inventory.214 Receipt of the handling fee
and billing credit was conditioned on the return of the replaced tire along
with an adjustment form signed by the customer. 15
The dealership, however, admitted to a scheme of defrauding Firestone
out of thousands of dollars by falsifying and forging the adjustment forms."'
The forms were necessary for Firestone to defend against the dealer's
claims because recovery required a determination of how many legitimate
warranty claims the plaintiff had to process."'
In granting Firestone's motion to dismiss the complaint on grounds of
unclean hands, the district court emphasized that the overriding reason
for the defense is to "protect the integrity of the court." 18 Because the
dealership's presence in the courtroom suggested a "danger to the
administration of justice," the district court applied the defense and barred
its claims for monetary relief.219
In reaching its conclusion that manufacturing evidence constitutes
unclean hands, the district court drew an analogy to Mas v. Coca-Cola Co.,z 0
where the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals applied unclean hands pursuant
to its equity jurisdiction." In Mas, the federal appellate court stated:
No court of equity [or court of law in this instance] ought to be required to
listen to a man whose very presence suggests danger to the administration
of justice and whose past conduct affecting the matter in litigation would
equitable relief of constructive trust and to deny unclean hands based on false trial testimony
because it was collateral to the main issues in the case) (second appeal) (applying Maryland
law).
212 Buchanan Home, 544 F. Supp. at 246.
213 Id. at 243.
214 Id.
215 Id. at 244.
216 Id.
217 Id. at 246.
2I8 Id. at 247.
219 Id. (quoting Mas v. Coca-Cola Co., 163 E2d 505, 51 1 (4th Cir. 1947)).
220 Mas, 163 F.2d 505.
221 Buchanan Home, 544 F. Supp. at 244-45 (citing Mas, 163 F2d at 5o7-o8). The plaintiff
in Mas "used forged documents and perjured testimony in his attempts to establish priority of
invention in the Patent Office." Mas, 163 F.2d at 507; see also Universal Builders, Inc. v. Moon
Motor Lodge, Inc., 244 A.2d 10, 15 (Pa. 1968) (citing Mas for the proposition that manufactur-
ing evidence in the existing case constitutes unclean hands).
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cast doubt upon the ability of the court to ascertain from him the truth with
respect thereto.222
As to its decision to apply unclean hands at law, the district court declared
that "rights not suited for protection at equity should not be protected at
law."" It also noted that Chafee and other twentieth century commentators
had called for the end to any distinction between law and equity after the
integration.22 4 It explained: "Court opinions and commentaries since the
procedural merger of law and equity in 1938 have expressed the view that
the clean hands doctrine embodies a general principle equally applicable
"1225to damage actions ....
While the "court opinions" referenced by the district court are not
directly on point, they do embody the idea of equal application of unclean
hands in principle. For example, in Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Chicago &
North Western Railway Co.,"2  the District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois boldly proclaimed that "[tihe clean hands maxim is not peculiar
to equity, but expresses a general principle equally applicable to damage
actions.""2  However, the case concerned only equitable relief. In making
the above statement, the court was attempting to justify its analogy to a
case seeking damages that involved an illegal contract made in violation of
securities laws.228
Additionally, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals decision in Tempo
Music, Inc. v. Myers229 arguably did not apply unclean hands to bar the legal
claims asserted.3 0 The case concerned a violation of federal copyright law,
and the appellate court invoked unclean hands to defeat the request for
equitable relief and equitable estoppel to estop the damages claim.2 ' The
district court in Buchanan Home, however, found Tempo Music to stand for
the proposition that unclean hands applies "[w]hether designated as the
222 Mas, 163 F.2d at 511;see also Mas v. Coca-Cola Co., 198 F.2d 380, 381 (4 th Cir. 1952)
("One who has had the door of a court of equity closed in his face because of his fraud may
not have relief by the simple device of beginning again and labeling his suit an action at law
for damages.") (upholding dismissal of patent action at law for damages, following dismissal of
equitable suit on the ground of unclean hands involving same patent).
223 Buchanan Home, 544 F. Supp. at 245.
224 Id.
225 Id. (citing Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Chi. & N.W. Ry. Co., 226 F. Supp. 400 (N.D. Ill.
1964); Tempo Music, Inc. v. Myers, 407 F.2d 503 (4th Cir. 1969)).
226 Union Pac. R.R. Co., 226 F. SupP. 400.
227 Id. at 410. (citing CHAFEE, supra note 5, at 94).
228 See id. (citing A. C. Frost & Co. v. Coeur d'Alene Mines Corp., 312 U.S. 38, 43
(1940).-
229 Tempo Music, 407 F.2d at 507-8.
23o Buchanan Home, 544 F. Supp. at 245.
231 Tempo Music, 407 F2d at 508 n.8 (noting that the infringer requested a list of copy-
righted songs from owner that the owner neglected to supply).
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principle underlying clean hands or as equitable estoppel."m
Citing Buchanan Home,233 the District Court of Maryland, in Smith v.
Cessna Aircraft Co.,2 34 prevented the recovery of damages under unclean
hands after the plaintiff lied during his deposition regarding his tax
returns. 23 Among other damages, the plaintiff sought compensation for the
income he lost while recuperating from injuries resulting from the crash
of his plane.236 Because the plaintiff's pre-trial perjury adversely affected
an accurate assessment of potential liability, the court dismissed the claim
relating to his lost income. 3 1
3. Ninth Circuit.-Notwithstanding its somewhat limited precedential
foundation, the logic of Buchanan Home and Tempo Music has been
persuasive to some federal courts in California. Most of those decisions, in
which the equitable doctrine of unclean hands was applied to bar actions
for legal damages, arose in claims under federal intellectual property law or
232 Buchanan Home, 544 E Supp. at 245 (Tempo Music "justified application of the clean
hands principle to the damages portion of the suit by stating that principles of equitable
estoppel would apply to deny the plaintiff its right to plead and prove the copyright
infringement."); accord Metro Publ'g., Ltd. v. San Jose Mercury News, Inc., 861 F Supp. 870,
88o (N.D. Cal. 1994) (citing both Buchanan Home and Tempo Music as authority to apply clean
hands to damages claims).
233 See Smith v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 124 E R.D. 103, l05-07 (D. Md. 1989); see also Stratton
v. Sacks, 99 B.R. 686, 694 (D. Md. 1989) ("Although the clean hands doctrine is an equitable
principle, it has been applied by a district court in this Circuit to defeat an action at law." (cita-
tions omitted)); McGovern v. Deutsche Post Global Mail, Ltd., No. Civ. JFM-o4-oo6o, 2004
WL I764088, at * io n.6 (D. Md. Aug. 4, 2004) (noting in dicta that "[t]he clean hands doctrine
originated in the courts of equity but now extends to actions at law" (citation omitted)).
234 Smith, 124 F.R.D. 103 (dismissing damages claim related to lost income).
235 Id. at 105-07.
236 Id. at 107.
237 The court explained:
It can hardly be disputed that Mr. Garner's hands are unclean with
respect to a matter at issue in this litigation. Mr. Garner has filed suit,
seeking damages resulting from the crash of his plane. As part of those
damages, he seeks compensation for the income he lost while recuper-
ating from his injuries. His tax returns are critical to allowing the de-
fendants to assess accurately their potential liability for these damages.
By providing the defendants with tax documents that were admittedly
false, and by lying in his deposition and answers to interrogatories, Mr.
Garner has abused the discovery system and has deprived the defen-
dants of essential information.
Id. (citing Buchanan Home, 544 F. Supp. at 24 6).The court summarized Buchanan Home writing,
"Plaintiff's fraud in submitting falsified adjustment forms to defendant hopelessly obscure[d]
any possibility of accurately resolving validity of plaintiff's claim." Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted). The court further explained that "the fact that the fraud and perjury are dis-
covered before trial does not vitiate the taint upon the litigation process as a whole." Id.
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state unfair competition law.23 s In copyright cases, unclean hands has even
evolved into a special defense of "copyright misuse.""'
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Supermarket of Homes, Inc. v.
San Fernando Valley Board of Realtors2 40 cited Buchanan Home and Tempo
Music in announcing that unclean hands may bar a legal action for copyright
infringement where the copyright holder misused the copyright.241 The
District Court for the Northern District of California in Metro Publishing,
Ltd. v. San Jose Mercury News, Inc.242 followed Supermarket ofHomes in finding
that unclean hands barred claims for damages on trademark infringement
and dilution claims.2 43 The district court also noted the decisions from
the Fourth Circuit in support of its judgment and quoted the following
passage from Buchanan Home: "Court opinions and commentaries since the
procedural merger of law and equity in 1938 have expressed the view that
the clean hands doctrine embodies a general principle equally applicable
to damage actions, and that rights not suited for protection in equity should
not be protected at law.""
In addition to borrowing cases from the Fourth Circuit to apply unclean
hands at law, Ninth Circuit precedent has had a spillover effect in at least
one other federal circuit.2 45
4. Seventh Circuit.-The District Court for the Northern District of Illinois
238 See, e.g., McCormick v. Cohn, No. CV 90-0323 H, 1992 WL 687291, at *3 (S.D. Cal.
July 31, 1992) (action for damages due to copyright infringement, trademark infringement,
and unfair competition barred by unclean hands).
239 See Magnuson v. Video Yesteryear, No. C-92-4o49 DLJ, 1994 WL 508826, at *5 (N.D.
Cal. September 9, 1994) ("[Unclean hands] operates to deprive a copyright owner from as-
serting infringement and asking for damages when the infringement occurred by the claim-
ant's dereliction of duty." (citing Supermarket of Homes, Inc. v. San Fernando Valley Bd. of
Realtors, 786 F.2d 1400, 1408 (9th Cir. 1986))), aff'd in part, rev'din part on other grounds, 85
F.3d 1424 (9th Cir. 1996); Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 785 F. Supp. 1392, 1399 (N.D.
Cal. 1992) ("The defense of copyright misuse is a form of unclean hands."), aff'din part, rev'd
in part on other grounds, 977 F.2d 1510 (9 th Cir. 1992).
240 Supermarket of Homes, 786 E 2d 1400.
241 Id. at 1408 (citing Tempo Music, Inc. v. Myers, 407 F2d 503, 507 (4th Cir. 1969);
Buchanan Home, 544 E Supp. at 245). The court did not apply the defense because it found
the facts did not constitute unclean hands. Id. at 14o8-09.
242 Metro Publ'g., Ltd. v. San Jose Mercury News, Inc., 861 E Supp. 870 (N.D. Cal.
1994).
243 Id. at 88o (citing Supermarket of Homes, 786 F.2d at 14o8).
244 Id. (quoting Buchanan Home, 544 F. Supp. at 245 (citation omitted)); see also id (citing
Tempo Music, 407 F2d at 507 & n.8 (4th Cit. 1969) (barring legal recovery due to unclean hands
"where alleged infringer sought copyright holder's assistance to avoid infringing copyright"
and holder failed to assist)).
245 See Alcatel USA, Inc. v. DGI Techs., Inc., 166 F3d 772, 792 & n.8o (5th Cir. 1999)
(explaining that the "[copyright misuse doctrine] has its historical roots in the unclean hands
defense") (citing Qad, Inc. v. ALN Assocs., Inc., 974 F.2d 834, 836 (7th Cir. 1992); Supermarket
of Homes, 786 F.2d at 1408).
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in Urecal Corp. v. Masters"6 followed the Ninth Circuit decision in Hall
v. Wright.247 In a diversity action involving unfair competition, the Urecal
court invoked the doctrine of unclean hands to bar both legal and equitable
remedies.248 Aware of the adoption issue in damages actions, the court
explained that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Federal Rules) left
intact a distinction between law and equity only for purposes of determining
the right to trial by jury.249
The court's reasoning in Urecal has been approved in other cases when
legal and equitable relief is joined.2 0 For instance, another Illinois district
court, in EnergizerHoldings, Inc. v. Duracell, Inc.,'2 1 applied Urecalas authority
to address unclean hands in a claim under the Lanham Act seeking both
money damages and equitable relief. 1 2 Urecal's holding, however, has not
been extended to cases solely seeking damages. 253
At least one decision from the Seventh Circuit interpreting the Federal
Rules appears to disagree and deems unclean hands available in actions
exclusively seeking damages." Soon after the merger, in fact, the court
246 Urecal Corp. v. Masters, 413 F. Supp. 873 (N.D. Ill. 1976).
247 Id. at 876. The district court reasoned: "In an unfair competition action like the case
at bar, where equitable and legal claims are joined, the doctrine of 'clean hands,' if indicated
by the facts, should preclude recovery on both claims." Id. (citing Hall v. Wright, 240 F.2d 787
(9th Cir. 1957) (affirming application of unclean hands)).
248 See id. at 874-76; see also id. at 876 (alternatively holding there was insufficient proof
of damages). Despite the state law claims, the court applied unclean hands as a matter of
federal law. See id; cf Am. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Chi. v. Levy, 404 N.E.2d 946, 948-49 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1980) (citing pre-merger precedent of the US Supreme Court to deny the defense
in actions at law).
249 Urecal, 413 E Supp. at 876 (citing Rogers v. Loether, 467 Ezd i 11o, 1119 (7th Cir.
1972)).
250 Parkman & Weston Assocs., Ltd. v. Ebenezer African Methodist Episcopal Church,
No. or C 9839, 2oo3 WL 22287358, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 2003) ("[ln certain situations the
clean hands doctrine may bar'a claim at law for damages.' For example, 'where equitable and
legal claims are joined, the doctrine of "clean hands," if indicated by the facts, should preclude
recovery on both claims."' (quoting Urecal, 413 E Supp. at 876)); Rauland Borg Corp. v. TCS
Mgmt. Grp., Inc., No. 9 3 C 6096, 1995 WL 242292, at * 12-14 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 24, 1995) (denying
summary judgment on unclean hands asserted to bar right to injunctive relief or damages).
251 Energizer Holdings, Inc. v. Duracell, Inc., No. oi C 9720, 2002 WL Io67688 (N.D.
Ill. May 28, 2002).
252 See id. at *3. Other cases are in accord for Lanham Act claims, although they denied
the defense for reasons other than its application at law. See also Alpo Petfoods, Inc. v. Ralston
Purina Co., 720 F Supp. 194,214 (D.D.C. 1989) ("The defense of unclean hands is available in
an action brought under the Lanham Act seeking equitable and monetary relief." (citing Am.
Home Prods. Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 654 E Supp. 568, 590 (S.D.N.Y. 1987))).
253 See Lopez v. Autoserve, L.L.C., No. 05 C 3554, 2005 WL 3116053, at *1 (N.D. Ill.
Nov. 17, 2005) (applying Illinois and federal law of unclean hands ) (striking affirmative de-
fense of unclean hands to bar violations of state and federal statutory employment law be-
cause the complaint sought only legal damages).
254 Maltz v. Sax, 134 E2d 2 ( 7th Cir. 1943).
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of appeals applied unclean hands to bar an action for damages under the
Sherman Anti-Trust Act. 5 5 Citing Rule 2 of the Federal Rules, the court
stated in Maltz v. Sax:256 "As to unclean hands: The maxims of equity are
available as defenses in actions at law."257
While the Seventh Circuit has not addressed unclean hands since
Maltz, the court has indicated a willingness to continue this precedent. In
Byron v. Clay,5 s for example, Judge Posner noted that while unclean hands
is traditionally applicable to legal claims under the "clean up" doctrine in
cases seeking both legal and equitable relief,25 9 it should perhaps no longer
be limited to equitable suits in light of the merger of law and equity.
2 6 0
He reasoned that even before the merger a counterpart legal doctrine to
unclean hands-in paridelicto-existed, which forbade a plaintiff to recover
damages if his fault was equal to the defendant's.
261
Judge Posner's comments inMaksymv. Loesc 2 62 regarding the application
of the purely equitable defense of laches at law were also telling:
Not only is there a long tradition of applying equitable defenses in cases
at law-indeed, fraud itself is an equitable defense typically interposed in
suits at law for breach of contract-but with the merger of law and equity
there is no longer a good reason to distinguish between the legal and
equitable character of defenses, save as the distinction may bear on matters
unaffected by the merger, such as the right to trial by jury in cases at law, a
right preserved in federal courts by the Seventh Amendment ... .'
Relying on the meaning of the merger as announced in Maltz and Byron,
district courts in Indiana have held all equitable defenses-including
unclean hands-available at law."*
255 Id. at 5.
256 Id.
257 Id. at 5 (citing federal statutory law and the Federal Rules).
258 Byron v. Clay, 867 F.2d 1049 (7th Cir.1989).
259 Id. at 1052 (citing Medtronic, Inc. v. Intermedics, Inc., 725 F.2d 440, 442-43 (7th Cir.
1984)).
260 Id.
261 Id. (citing Holman v. Johnson, (1775) 98 Eng. Rep. 1120 (K.B.); I Cowp. 341
(Mansfield, C.J.)).
262 Maksym v. Loesch, 937 F2d 1237 (7 th Cir. 1991).
263 Id. at 1248 (citation omitted) (ultimately determining that laches would not apply to
legal relief under Illinois law).
264 See Columbus Reg'I Hosp. v. Patriot Med. Techs. Inc., No. IP o-1 4 o4-C K/H, 2004
WL 392938, at *7 (S.D. Ind. Feb 11, 2004) (citing FED. R. CIv. P. 2; FED. R. Civ. P. 8) (denying
summary judgment on affirmative defense of unclean hands as a matter of federal law in a
diversity case); see also Decatur Ventures, L.L.C. v. Stapleton Ventures, Inc., No. i:o4-CV-
o5 62-JDT-WTL, 2006 WL 1367436, at *4 (S.D. Ind. May 17, 2oo6) (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 2;




5. Sixth Circuit.-Consistent with the decisions from the district courts in
Illinois, the District Court for the Southern District of Ohio in Big Lots
Stores, Inc. v. Jaredco, Inc. 65 also indicated that unclean hands is available
to bar a claim for damages in a business dispute requesting both legal and
equitable relief." Moreover, similar to the Northern District of Illinois in
Urecal Corp. v. Masters,267 the court relied on federal law to define unclean
hands in a diversity case. 2 6 In contrast to Urecal, however, it did not
explicitly discuss the extension of the defense to legal claims.2 69
In Big Lots Stores, a creditor sued a debt collection agency asserting state
law claims for breach of confidentiality contract and conversion of customer
accounts.7 0 The agency claimed unclean hands barred the lawsuit on two
grounds."' First, it contended that the creditor fraudulently attempted to
induce it to begin performance of the proposed agreement for purchase
of uncollected checks.7 2 Second, it alleged that the creditor engaged in
litigation misconduct by various activities that amounted to suborning
perjury." The court did not discuss the defense's application to legal
claims, but instead held that there was insufficient evidence to establish
the defense.274 The court also found the perjury claims to be "tangential"
to the central issue in the case regarding breach of contract."
6. Fifth Circuit.-The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Kuehnert v. Texstar
Corp."' allowed unclean hands to bar a tippee from recovering losses
against an insider/tipper for providing false information in federal securities
litigation." Unlike the Seventh Circuit opinion considering unclean hands
265 Big Lots Stores, Inc. v. Jaredco, Inc., 182 F. Supp. 2d 644 (S.D. Ohio 2002).
266 See id. at 653.
267 Urecal Corp. v. Masters, 413 F Supp. 873, 876 (N.D. Ill. t976).
268 Big Lots Stores, 182 F. Supp. 2d at 652-53. The court relied on precedent from the US
Supreme Court, see Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S.
8o6, 814 (1945), to define unclean hands and cited case law from the Sixth Circuit, see Kearney
& Trecker Corp. v. Cincinnati Milacron Inc., 562 F.2d 365, 371 (6th Cir. 1977), to establish
the appropriate burden of proof. Big Lots Stores, 182 F. Supp. at 652. But see id. at 644 (West
Headnotes stating that unclean hands was decided as a matter of Ohio law).
269 Big Lots Stores, 182 F. Supp. 2d at 652.
270 See id. at 648-51.
271 Id. at 652-53.
272 Id. at 653.
273 See id. (alleging activities such as obtaining a temporary restraining order under
wrongful or deceitful circumstances, preparing false affidavits, and exchanging debt forgive-
ness for friendly affidavits).
274 Id. at 652.
275 Id. at 653 n.2 (noting that the litigation misconduct claims, at most, go to damages).
276 Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp., 412 F.2d 700 (5th Cir. 1969).
277 Id. at 704.
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in another federal statutory action in Maltz v. Sax,"' the Fifth Circuit made
no mention of the merger of law and equity or any potential barrier to the
application of the equitable defense of unclean hands due to the law-
equity distinction.27 9 It focused exclusively on whether the application of
unclean hands and the legal defense of inparideicto were consonant with
the policies of the federal securities statute."'o Like Mallis v. Bankers Trust
Co., the court of appeals used the legal and equitable defenses without
discussion of any difference between them.za'
Consequently, within the federal and state court systems, cases are
incorporating unclean hands into the common law through a combination
of utility, intuition, and oversight. As addressed below, a close examination
of existing precedents also exposes the possibility for even broader
application of the doctrine in the future.
III. THE FUTURE: FROM PEDIGREE TO POLICY
Parts I and II described the continuing conflict in the cases concerning
the merger and its effect on the incorporation of unclean hands into the
law. This Part moves beyond an examination of the results to explore
more thoroughly the reasons behind the growing body of decisional rules
incorporating unclean hands into the law and the principles upon which
they stand. Understanding the premises of the precedents considering
unclean hands provides inspiration for the future of the defense in damages
or other legal actions."'
278 Maltz v. Sax, 134 F.2d 2, 5 (7th Cir. 1943) (citing federal statutory law and the Federal
Rules)).
279 Kuehnert, 412 F.2d at 703-05.
28o See id The majority explained: "The question must be one of policy: which decision
will have the better consequences in promoting the objective of the securities laws by increas-
ing the protection to be afforded the investing public." Id. at 704; see also id. at 703 (citing cases
establishing the availability of unclean hands in SEC proxy requirements); 703 n.6 (citing
cases establishing the availability of unclean hands in labor disputes). The dissent disagreed
with the application of unclean hands on policy grounds. See id. at 705 (Godbold, J., dissent-
ing); accord Nathanson v. Weis, Voisin, Cannon, Inc., 325 E Supp. 50,53 (S.D.N.Y 1971); E.F.
Hutton & Co. v. Berns, 682 F2d 173, 176 n.6 (8th Cir. 1982) (citing securities law violation
cases which either allow or deny the in pari delicto defense). Thus, the court divided solely on
whether barring the lawsuit pursuant to unclean hands would promote the purposes of the
federal securities statute. See generally Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Statutory Violations and Equitable
Discretion, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 524 (1982) (suggesting courts have less remedial discretion in
statutory versus common law or constitutional causes of action).
281 Kuehnert, 412 F.2d at 704-05. But see Nathanson, 325 F. Supp. at 52 (referencing the
issue in Kuehnert as the application of inparidelicto). InMallisv. Bankers TrustCo., 615 F.2d 68,
75-76 (2d Cir. 1980), however, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals considered unclean hands
only against the pendant state claims.
282 See Frederick Schauer, Do Cases Make Bad Lare?, 73 U. CHI. L. Rev. 883, 889-qo (2006)
(discussing how the reasons for rules announced in decisions may have normative weight
and constrain future decisions); see also Richard B. Cappalli, The Common Laws Case Against
2010-2011] 99
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
Significantly, some decisions denying the defense at law have been made
without the citation to any authority.28 3 Certain courts citing decisional law
relied on opinions that pre-dated the merger of law and equitym84 or that
otherwise were not on point.8 5 Moreover, many cases rejecting the defense
in damages actions are distinguishable because they contain qualifying
language and have been subject to alternative holdings.2 6
In particular, a review of those decisions denying the defense at law
reveals some hesitancy in the holdings: words such as "generally" 87 or
"usually" 8  often precede the rule of denial. For example, the Delaware
Superior Court explained in USH Ventures v. Global Telesystems Group, Inc.
that "[tlhe defense of 'unclean hands' is generally inappropriate for legal
remedies."289 While the use of such conditional terms may express a
willingness to find favor in the doctrine's application at law in the future,
it also provides grounds for the court to create a policy exception like the
Non-PrecedentialOpinions, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 755,784 (2003) (noting changing nature of judicial
decisions from common law to statutory substitutes); Peter M. Tiersma, The Textualization of
Precedent, 82 NOTRE DMoE L. REv. 1187, 1187-88 (2007) (describing the textualization of the
common law and the greater interpretative constraints on those who apply it). In analyzing the
issue of fusion of legal and equitable doctrines, Justice Keith Mason, of the New South Wales
Court of Appeals of Australia, related his view that "the accumulated judicial wisdom of the
ages remains a starting (and usually finishing) point for decision-making, even at the appellate
level." Mason, supra note 26, at 72.
283 See Gen. Dev. Corp. v. Binstein, 743 F. Supp. I I15, 1133-34 (D.N.J. 1990) (applying
Florida, Connecticut, and Massachusetts law); Spitler v. Perry Town Lot & Improvement Co.,
179 N.W. 69, 70 (Iowa 1920) (ruling without citation that unclean hands does not bar de-
fenses, only affirmative equitable relief); Wilson v. Prentiss, 140 P.3 d 288, 292-93 (Colo. App.
2oo6); Hasbro Bradley, Inc. v. Coopers & Lybrand, 515 N.Y.S.2d 461, 463 (App. Div. 1987);
cf Rodriguez v. Dicoa Corp., 318 So. 2d 442, 446 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975) ("No authority is
required" in reversing equitable attachment in legal action).
284 See, e.g., Merchs. Indem. Corp. v. Eggleston, 179 A.2d 505, 514 (N.J. 1962) (citing
federal pre-merger precedent from the United States Supreme Court).
285 See discussion of cases cited supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text (denying un-
clean hands from precedent considering the defense to ban equitable relief); see also supra
note 45 (discussing Alabama case relying on purported decisional law to deny unclean hands
in a damages action based on precedent that did not address the issue).
286 See infra notes 287-96 and accompanying text.
287 Universal Builders, Inc. v. Moon Motor Lodge, Inc., 244 A.2d 10, 14 (Pa. 1968) ("[It
generally has been held that the doctrine operates only to deny equitable, and not legal, rem-
edies.") (citations omitted) (emphasis added); Russell v. Casebolt, 384 S.W.2d 548, 553 (Mo.
1964) (discussing the "inapplicability of the doctrine generally in cases at law" (citation omit-
ted) (emphasis added)); see also Sandobal v. Armour & Co., 429 F.2d 249, 257 (8th Cir. 1970)
(laches "is rarely, if ever, invoked" in an action at law).
288 Clark v. Amoco Prod. Co., 794 F.2d 967, 971 (5 th Cir. 1986) ("Laches is usually avail-
able only in suits ... in equity. .. .") (citations omitted) (emphasis added); DiMauro v. Pavia,
492 F. Supp. 1051, io68 (D. Conn. 1979) ("The principle of unclean hands is usually applied
only to prevent affirmative relief ... ") (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
289 USH Ventures v. Global Telesystems Grp., Inc., 796 A.2d 7, 2o n. 16 (Del. Super. Ct.
2000) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
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Cummings and Maldonado courts in Michigan."' Specifically, the District
Court for the Southern District of NewYork in Gala Jewelry, Inc. v. Haring'1
struck an unclean hands defense to damages claims but contemplated
its application in the future: "Even if, as defendant insists, there may be
exceptions to that rule where circumstances and justice require, this case
presents no such exceptional circumstance."292
Another possible ground of distinction is hedging in the form of
alternative holdings.293 Such additional, independent reasons are frequently
found in the decisions denying the defense in cases of legal relief. These
reasons include the failure to satisfy the elements of unclean hands 294 and
that its application would be inconsistent with the policies or equities in the
case. 295 Even cases refusing the defense against legal remedies exclusively
due to its equitable origin can be explained on other grounds. 29 6
Furthermore, changing rationales for applying the defense to legal cases
suggests the possibility of less judicial resistance to unclean hands in the
future. Indeed, despite the chaotic jurisprudence, the most promising aspect
of the judicial reasoning process seems to be a shift in attitude.29 1 Many of
the post-merger cases rejecting unclean hands did so without precedential
support actually denying the defense in actions for damages. 29 ' The courts
290 See Maldonado v. Ford Motor Co., 719 N.W.2d 809, 818 (Mich. 2oo6) (creating excep-
tion to general rule against unclean hands in cases seeking legal relief on grounds of court
protection); Cummings v. Wayne Cnty., 533 N.W.2d 13, 14 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995) (same); see
also discussion supra notes 152-77 and accompanying text.
291 Gala Jewelry, Inc. v. Harring, No. 05 Civ. 7 7 13 (GEL), 2006 WL 3734202, at *2-3
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 18, 2oo6) (granting motion to strike unclean hands defense to damages claims
for breach of contract, negligence, and conversion).
292 Id. at *2 n.3 (citing Keystone Driller Co. v. Gen. Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 240, 245-46
(1933)).
293 See Ellwood v. Mid States Commodities, Inc., 404 N.W.2d 174, 184 (Iowa 1987) (al-
ternative holding). The courts applying the doctrine of unclean hands to bar legal relief have
also found other grounds to support their decision. See Urecal Corp. v. Iasters, 413 E Supp.
873, 876 (N.D. Ill. 1976) (alternatively holding there was insufficient proof of damages even if
unclean hands did not apply to bar legal relief).
294 Courts typically find there is no connection between the case and the unclean con-
duct. See Karpierz v. Easley, 68 S.W. 3 d 565, 572 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002); Hasbro Bradley, Inc. v.
Coopers & Lybrand, 515 N.Y.S.2d 461, 463 (App. Div. 1987); Birk v. Jackson, 75 S.W2d 918,
920 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934). Courts may also find that the conduct does not rise to the level of
unclean hands. See Beldt v. Leise, 6o P.3 d 1119, 1122 (Or. Ct. App. 2003)-
295 See, e.g., Billes v. Bailey, 555 A.2d 460, 462-63 (D.C. 1989); Universal Builders, Inc.
v. Moon Motor Lodge, Inc., 244 A.2d 10, 15 (Pa. 1968) (finding unclean hands inapplicable to
legal claims as one of three alternative holdings).
296 See, e.g., Swisher v. Swisher, 124 S.W. 3 d 477, 483-84 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003).
297 See USH Ventures v. Global Telesystems Grp., Inc., 796 A.2d 7, 19 (Del. Super. Ct.
2000) ("Courts of law have become increasingly flexible and have abandoned the worship
of formalism and technicality that spawned the development of the split system of law and
equity in England.").
298 See, e.g., Tarasi v. Pittsburgh Nat'l Bank, 555 F.2d 1152, 1156 n.9 (3d Cir. 1977) (stating
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relied on an absence of authority applying the doctrine to legal claims and
cited only equitable relief cases applying unclean hands.2" Now, courts
like First Fairfield Funding in Connecticut and Unilogic in California are
making the opposite assumption.3 * Rather than requiring counsel to find
cases that apply the defense at law, these courts mandate counsel to find
cases rejecting it.3 0' If none exist, the defense of unclean hands is available
to defeat legal relief.0
Even courts following the law-equity distinction to dictate the denial of
unclean hands in actions at law have found ways to invoke the defense by
expanding the categories on both sides of the "equitable action or relief"
equals "equitable defense" equation. Courts apply unclean hands (or other
equity-dependent doctrines) by construing the case or claim to be equitable
in nature as opposed to origin.303 This penumbral phenomenon can be seen
rule without authority); discussion supra Part I.
299 See In re Estate of Barnes, 754 A.2d 284, 288 n.6 (D.C. 2000) (denying unclean hands
because "we know of no authority for applying this 'maxim of equity' to a legal claim for
money." (citations omitted)); Freemont Homes, Inc. v. Elmer, 974 P.2d 952, 959 (Wyo. 1999)
(supporting denial of the defense solely from precedent considering unclean hands to ban
equitable relief); discussion supra Part I; cf Mason, supra note 26, at 68 ("Chancery's unwill-
ingness to award damages during the early nineteenth century was seen by some writers at
the time to have been jurisdictional, in the sense of establishing an absence of power." (citing
PM McDERMorr, EQUITABLE DAMAGES (1994)).
300 See First Fairfield Funding, L.L.C. v. Goldman, No. CV020465799S, 2003 WL
22708882, at *I (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 3, 2003); Unilogic, Inc. v. Burroughs Corp., I2 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 741, 745 (Ct. App. 1992); Boca Raton Cmty. Hosp., Inc. v. Tenet Healthcare Corp., 238
F.R.D. 679, 693-94 (S.D. Fla. 2006); Burton v. Sosinsky, 250 Cal. Rptr. 33, 41 (Ct. App. 1988)
("Although no case directly on point has been located, we see no reason why a successful de-
fense of unclean hands should not bar the foreclosure of the mechanics' lien.").
301 Boca Raton Cmty. Hosp., 238 F.R.D. at 693; Unilogic, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 745; First
Fairfield Funding, 2003 WL 22708882, at * I.
302 See Boca Raton Cmly. Hosp., 238 F.R.D. at 693; Unilogic, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 745; First
Fairfield Funding, 2003 WL 22708882, at *i.
303 See Sender v. Mann, 423 F. Supp. 2d 1155, 1167-68 (D. Colo. 2oo6) (applying Colorado
law) (finding bankruptcy trustee's fraudulent conveyance claims were equitable in nature and
subject to unclean hands even though trustee only sought money damages); see also C&K
Eng'g Contractors v. Amber Steel Co., 587 P.2d 1136, 1138-41 (Cal. 1978) (evaluating promis-
sory estoppel for purposes of determining the right to trial by jury); Philpott v. Superior Court,
36 P.2d 635, 64o-4I (Cal. 1934) (en banc) (discussing confusion with quasi-contract that origi-
nated in law but that is equitable in nature); Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co. v. State Land Bd.,
439 P.2d 575, 578 (Or. 1968) (en banc) (reviewing case determining that quo warranto was
equitable in nature despite being denominated as an action at law under the statute for the
purpose of applying laches); MEGARRY & BAKER, supra note 6, at 6 (discussing dual meaning
of "equity"). In many cases, it is difficult to discern the origin of the equitable claim or relief
due to its mixed heritage. See Anenson, supra note 3, at 497 ("[Rlemedies have become so
intertwined in this post-merger world that it is difficult to discern what is or was equity versus
law. The advent of statutory causes of action compounds the problem.") (citations omitted)
(providing examples); Mason, supra note 26, at 46 ("Very few causes of action or remedies
will be exclusively equitable in historical derivation and even these are now statutory in most
cases."); see also Yeo, supra note 20, at 168 (arguing that the mixed and uncertain heritage of
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in opinions referencing "quasi-equitable" relief,3 " or in contradistinction,
"purely" 30 s or "strictly"o' legal rights.
Whether the foregoing circumstances reflect a changing attitude or not,
it is enough to observe that a handful of states across the country have
begun the process of assimilation. 30' An increasing number of federal
courts have also applied the defense to bar legal claims. 308 In incorporating
unclean hands into the law, courts focus their reasoning on the purpose
of the merger statutes and rules.3 09 They also use other authoritative
sources of interpretation, such as precedent, in allowing unclean hands
to be considered in legal cases. 3 o For instance, courts ruling on cases of
first impression often apply unclean hands at law by analogy to decisions
that recognized comparable unclean conduct against equitable remedies.31"
Alternatively, cases concerning legal remedies should apply a kindred legal
defense like in pari delicto 3 1 or an equitable defense like estoppel may
equitable doctrines will unduly complicate choice of law analysis for equity).
304 Ashley v. Boyle's Famous Corned Beef Co., 66 F3d 164, 169 (8th Cir. 1995) (quoting
Maksym v. Loesch, 937 F.2d 1237, 1248 (7th Cit. 1991) (laches)), abrogated on other grounds,
Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 (2002); see also Russell v. Casebolt, 384
S.W.2d 548, 553 (Mo. 1964) ("wholly or partially in equity").
305 Ashley, 66 F3d at 169; Maksym, 937 F2d at 1248; Corvallis Sand, 439 P2d at 578 (quo
warranto).
306 Am. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Chi. v. Levy, 404 N.E.2d 946, 948 (1ll. App. Ct. 1980)
(unclean hands); see also Clark v. Amoco Prod. Co., 794 F.2d 967, 971 (5th Cir. 1986) (laches).
307 See discussion supra Part II; cf Stefanie A. Lindquist & Frank B. Cross, Empirically
Testing Dworkin's Chain Novel Theory: Studying the Path of Precedent, 8o N.Y. U. L. REV. I 156,
1173-77 (2005) (finding that judges are more ideological and prone to decide based on policy
preferences in cases without doctrinal direction than in those governed by precedent).
308 See discussion supra Part II.
309 See Anenson, supra note 3, at 474-76; discussion supra Part II. None of the opinions
incorporating unclean hands into the law appeared to acknowledge the historical distinction
between the different kinds of equitable defenses based on their pre-merger pleading prac-
tices. See, e.g., Jesperson v. Ponichtera, 2 Conn. L. Rptr. 105, 105 (Super. Ct. 1990) ("Another
recognized principle is that equitable defenses may be interposed against actions at law."
(citation omitted)).
310 See discussion supra Part 11; cf. Frederick Schauer, Why Precedent in Law (and Elsewhere)
Is Not Totally (or Even Substantially) About Analogy, 3 PERSP. ON PSYCHOL. SCI. 454,457-58 (2oo8)
(distinguishing principle of precedent from reasoning by analogy).
31 1 See, e.g., Buchanan Home & Auto Supply Co. v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 544 F
Supp. 242, 247 (D.S.C. 1981) (citing Mas v. Coca-Cola Co., 163 F2d 505 (4th Cir. 1947)); see
also Stratton v. Sacks, 99 B.R. 686, 694 (D. Md. 1989) ("Although the clean hands doctrine is
an equitable principle, it has been applied by a district court in this Circuit to defeat an ac-
tion at law." (citations omitted)). A number of courts have been persuaded to extend unclean
hands to legal remedies by reference to the United States Supreme Court equity decision in
Precision Instrument Manufacturing Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Machinery Co., 324 U.S. 806
(1945). See, e.g., Kendall-Jackson Winery, Ltd. v. Superior Court, 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d 743, 749 (Ct.
App. 1999); Cummings v. Wayne Cnty., 533 N.W.2d 13, 14 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995).
312 See discussion supra Part II. Courts have also used the terms in pari delicto and un-
clean hands interchangeably or have relied on the similarity between unclean hands and this
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be used to justify a court's decision.3 " But the most persuasive principle
seems to be policy.314
kindred legal defense in justifying the availability of unclean hands in legal cases. See, e.g.,
Blain v. Doctor's Co., 272 Cal. Rptr. 250, 258 (Ct. App. 1990) (recognizing unclean hands at
law by accepting guidance from the Pennsylvania case of Feld&Sons, Inc. v. Pechner Dorfman,
Wolfee, Rounick &Cabot, 4 5 8 A.2d 545, 551-52 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983) in which the general legal
principle of inparidelicto was applied); Manown v. Adams, 598 A.2d 821, 825 n.6 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1991) (equating unclean hands and inpari delicto defenses), rev'don other grounds, 615
A.2d 61 1, 612 (Md. 1992); Smith v. Long, 723 N.Y.S.2d 584, 586-87 (App. Div. 2001) (holding
unclean hands applicable to legal relief by reference to the defense of inparideicto and declar-
ing unclean hands available in "law or equity"). Butsee Truitt v. Miller, 407 A.2d 1073, 1079-80
(D.C. 1979) (citation omitted) (denying unclean hands defense in action at law despite noting
its similarity to in paridelicto); Ellwood v. Mid States Commodities, Inc. 404 N.W.2d 174, 184
(Iowa 1987) (willing to apply illegality or against public policy but not unclean hands); Russell
v. Casebolt, 384 S.W.2d 548, 553 (Mo. 1964) (same). Judge Posner's dictum in Byron v. Clay
also compared unclean hands and in pari delicto in concluding that unclean hands should no
longer be limited to equitable actions. Byron v. Clay, 867 F.2d 1049, 1052 (7th Cir. 1989) (cit-
ing Holman v. Johnson, (1775) 98 Eng. Rep. 1120 (K.B.); I CowP. 341 (Lord Mansfield C.J.)).
Similar to unclean hands, the doctrine of in pari delicto preserves the dignity of the courts and
deters illegal behavior. See Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 3o6
(1985) ("[Ciourts should not lend their good offices to mediating disputes among wrongdoers;
... denying judicial relief to an admitted wrongdoer is an effective means of deterring illegal-
ity." (citations omitted)). But the defenses are not an exact match. See Anenson, Process-Based
Theory of Unclean Hands, supra note 4, at 566-69. In paridelicto requires a common scheme and
imposes a guilt differential between the parties (i.e. that the claimant's guilt be less than the
respondent). Bateman Eichler, 472 U.S. at 307, 3 1o-I (confining the application of in pari de-
licto under federal anti-trust laws and federal securities laws to the doctrine's traditional limi-
tations, which require that the plaintiff bear "at least substantially equal responsibility for the
violations he seeks to redress"); id. at 306 ("In a case of equal or mutual fault .. . the position
of the [defending] party ... is the better one." (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 711 (5th ed.
1979) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Nathanson v. Weis, Voisin,
Cannon, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 50, 53 n.I I (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (explaining under the securities laws
that in pari delicto is narrower than unclean hands as it contemplates "equal and simultaneous
participation by the parties in the same illegal activity").
313 See, e.g., Tempo Music, Inc. v. Myers, 407 F.2d 503, 507-08 (4th Cir. 1969); Buchanan
Home, 544 E Supp. at 245; see also discussion supra notes 231-32 and accompanying text. Some
courts have converted laches into an estoppel in order to apply the defense at law. See, e.g.,
Maksym v. Loesch, 937 F.2d 1237, 1248 (7th Cir. 1991) ("It is really a doctrine of estoppel rath-
er than a substitute for a statute of limitations." (citation omitted)); Davenport Osteopathic
Hosp. Ass'n v. Hosp. Serv., Inc., 154 N.W.2d 153, 162 (Iowa 1967); Moore v. Phillips, 627 P.2d
831, 835 (Kan. Ct. App. 1981). In other countries that share our common law heritage, there
has been considerable debate concerning the fusion of legal and equitable principles and
doctrines by analogy. Anthony Mason, Fusion, in EQuITY IN COMMERCIAL LAW, supra note 20,
at I I, 12; see also Smith, supra note 25, at 22 n.15 (defining a "fusion fallacy" as "a belief in
substantive fusion" (citation omitted)); James Edelman, A "Fusion Fallacy" Fallacy, 119 LAW
Q. REv. 375, 379-80 (2003) (discussing the possible grounds for supporting fusion by analogy
and the academic justifications for such an approach).
314 See Anenson, supra note 3, at 476-508 (analyzing policies in favor of considering un-
clean hands in legal cases and the cases supporting them); T Leigh Anenson, From Theory to
Practice: Analyzing Equitable Estoppel Under a Pluralistic Model of Law, II LEWIS & CLARK L.
REV. 633, 66o (2007) (suggesting that policy analysis be the preferred method of interpretation
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Courts are engaging in implicit and explicit policy analysis in
incorporating unclean hands into the law."'1 An indirect policy-oriented
approach is evident from the fact that some courts cite decisions allowing
analogous legal and fully-fused equitable defenses against legal relief,
as well as cases applying unclean hands to equitable relief."1 6 A decision
justifying the application of unclean hands in damages actions by relying
on the defense's use in equity cases levels the fictional severity or
superiority between legal and equitable forms of relief."' These analogies
also acknowledge equivalency between not only the conduct supporting
these legal and equitable defenses, but also the interests and purposes
they serve."' In particular, by matching the kinds of conduct deserving
in equitable estoppel cases); see also id. at 659 (noting that equity has come to be regarded as
public policy and that both equity and public policy promote the same purpose of change
based on modern morality); Robert S. Stevens, A Brief on Behalf ofa Course in Equity, 8 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 422, 424-25 (1956) (noting one of the factors to influence a decision in equity was that
special consideration was given to the public interest).
Analyzing the fusion of legal and equitable doctrines in Australia, Justice Mason ex-
plained: "Investigation of pedigree is being eclipsed by the greater need to have regard to the
function served by a particular right or remedy and to the overlap of the parallel or discordant
strands suggested by historical enquiries about 'legal' and 'equitable' rules." Mason, supra
note 26, at 42; see also id. at 71.
315 Given the indeterminacy associated with the range of choice, including the selection
of policy goals and the process of balancing the competing policies, policy analysis has been
described as the most subjective type of legal argument. See WILSON HUHN, THE FIVE TYPES
OF LEGAL ARGUMENT 68 (zooz); see also id. at 54 (tracing policy analysis to the "'ends-means"'
philosophy of teleology (citation omitted)).
316 HUHN, supra note 315, at 120 (explaining that deeming another decision a "prec-
edent" based on a similarity in values is a form of policy analysis); see discussion supra notes
311-314 and accompanying text.
317 See William J. Lawrence, II I, Note, TheApplication of the Clean Hands Doctrine in Damage
Actions, 57 NOTRE DAME LAW. 673,681 (1982) (calling for recognition of unclean hands in cases
seeking legal relief because damages are often as severe as equitable remedies); Anenson,
supra note 3, at 490-96 (listing lack of differential in relief as one reason to recognize unclean
hands at law); see also id. at 490 ("Even if damages are less harmful in a particular case, such
severity does not derive from any purported difference between law and equity." (citation
omitted)); cf Douglas Laycock, The Death of the Irreparable Injury Rule, 103 HARV. L. REV. 687,
701 (1990) (concluding that a remedial hierarchy of legal and equitable relief no longer ex-
ists with respect to the irreparable injury rule requiring "no adequate remedy at law" before
equitable relief); DOUGLAS LAYcOCK, THE DEATH OF THE IRREPARABLE INJURY RULE 265-76
(1991) (same); see also USH Ventures v. Global Telesystems Grp., Inc., 796 A.2d 7, 15 (Del.
Super. CC. 2000) (concluding that "we need to desert the whole idea of hierarchy between law
and equity"); CHAFEE, supra note 5, at 29; Garvey, supra note 42, at 67-68. Professor Newman
concluded long ago that the assumption that the enforcement of equitable rights is not a mat-
ter of right, but rather a privilege, "has long since become obsolete." NEWMAN, supra note 6, at
38. But see DOBBS, supra note 13, §2.4(2), at 69 (endorsing rights versus privilege dichotomy in
denying unclean hands at law).
318 HUHN, supra note 315, at 120 (explaining that judicial opinions become precedents
by a matching of facts and/or values). Justice Cardozo found the practice of drawing analogies
to the facts of the case without also considering the values involved incomplete: "Some judges
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dismissal in these decisions with unclean hands, courts are making a value
judgment that litigants (and courts) should be treated the same in legal and
equitable actions.3 19
In addition to achieving policy objectives indirectly through the
precedential form of analysis,3 20 courts have also declared their policy
preferences directly. In adopting unclean hands in legal cases, for example,
the Superior Court of Connecticut concluded: "The integrity of the court is
no less worthy of protection in action[s] at law, than in actions in equity." 2'
The district court in Buchanan Home likewise invoked unclean hands
against claims for legal relief because "rights not suited for protection at
equity should not be protected at law."32 2 In fact, it is the unity of facts and
values between legal defenses and unclean hands that caused Professor
Chafee's comment that the defense "ought not to be called a maxim of
equity because it is by no means confined to equity."32 3
seldom get beyond that process in any case. Their notion of their duty is to match the colors of
the case at hand against the colors of many sample cases spread out upon their desk. The sam-
ple nearest in shade supplies the applicable rule." BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE
JUDICIAL PROCESS 20 (1921); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Commentary, On Analogical Reasoning,
lo6 HARv. L. REV. 741, 756-57 (1993).
319 Mason, supra note 313, at 15 ("There is no place for inconsistent treatment of like
cases."); Smith, supra note 20, at 23 ("This goal [of treating like cases alike] is part of the rule
of law, but only, I think, because it is rational to treat like cases alike, and if the law is not
rational it loses its normative force."). Case analysis depends on what points of similarity and
dissimilarity are deemed important. HUHN, supra note 315, at I zo; Anenson, supra note 314, at
641 ("[T]he technique of developing grounds of decision based on reported judicial experi-
ence is an art." (citation omitted)). How the judge answers the question of importance deter-
mines whether the prior decisional rule will be distinguished or applied. See STEVEN J. BURTON,
AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND LEGAL REASONING 83 (1985); see also Scott Brewer, Exemplary
Reasoning: Semantics, Pragmatics, and the Rational Force of Legal Argument by Analogy, I 09 HARV.
L. REV 923, ioi6 (1996) (explaining grounds to apply cases by analogy and to distinguish
them); John Dickinson, The Law Behind Law: II, 29 COLUMI. L. REV. 285, 290 (1929) (discussing
the value judgments made by judges when choosing one analogy over another).
320 Wilson Huhn describes the types of legal argument under his proposed pluralistic
model of law as a system of legal reasoning techniques because they are interrelated. HUHN,
supra note 315, at 81 -82. In a single argument, one may utilize multiple arguments at the same
time and in such a way that they may be distinguishable from each other. Id.
321 First Fairfield Funding, L.L.C. v. Goldman, No. CV02046 5 799S, 2003 WL 22708882,
at *I (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 3, 2003).
322 Buchanan Home & Auto Supply Co. v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 544 F. Supp.
242, 245 (D.S.C. 1981); accord Metro Publ'g, Ltd. v. San Jose Mercury News, Inc., 861 F. Supp.
870, 88o (N.D. Cal. 1994) (quoting Buchanan Home).
323 Chafee I, supra note 2, at 878 (quoted in Messick v. Smith, 69 A.2d 478, 481 (Md.
1949)). Justice Brandeis had a similar motivation in expressing his opinion of the universal
nature of unclean hands: "The governing principle has long been settled. It is that a court
will not redress a wrong when he who invokes its aid has unclean hands. The maxim of un-
clean hands comes from courts of equity. But the principle prevails also in courts of law."
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 483-84 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (citations
omitted). Brandeis' dissents in Olmstead and other cases were later adopted by the majority
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The failure in many jurisdictions to consult equitable theories like
unclean hands in legal cases that redress the same interests sought in suits
in equity threatens to create inconsistencies across these analogous areas
and endangers the overall capacity of the law to treat similarly situated
parties the same.324 The post-merger trend of adopting unclean hands
into the law establishes that courts are no longer satisfied that traditional
differences in form 2 5 support different treatment in substance.116 What
of the Supreme Court under the so-called supervisory power doctrine. See Sara Sun Beale,
Reconsidering Supervisory Power in Criminal Cases: Constitutional and Statutory Limits on the
Authority of the Federal Courts, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1433, 1443 (1984) (citing, e.g., McNabb v.
United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943)). Under this doctrine, the Court accepted Brandeis's view
that litigation misconduct principally harms the court and not the litigant. Id at 1452.
324 See Anenson, supra note 3, at 477 (criticizing the continued discrimination against
unclean hands on the basis of an alleged historical impediment given the similarities of the
defense to legal and other fully incorporated equitable defenses); accord James Edelman &
Simone Degeling, Introduction to EQUITY IN COMMERCIAL LAW, supra note 20, at I, I (advo-
cating structural approach to the fusion of legal and equitable principles and doctrines in
other common law countries); see also Mark P. Gergen, Tortious Interference: How It Is Enguljing
Commercial Law, Why This Is Not Entirely Bad, and a Prudential Response, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 1 175,
1220-23 (1996) (noting the importance of identifying and reconciling the justifications un-
derlying other ancillary bodies of law). Failing to account for similar policies and purposes in
deciding cases is especially pernicious given that the historical differences in form have been
eradicated with the merger of law and equity in most jurisdictions. Anenson, supra note 3, at
478 ("[T]he absurdity of courts climbing over a barrier built by historical accident is amplified
now that that barrier no longer exists."); accord Mason, supra note 313, at 14 ("The unsatisfac-
tory and confused state into which the law in this area has fallen is little short of a disgrace."
(citation omitted)); see also Anenson, supra note 3, at 492 (illustrating past and present cases
reaching opposite outcomes) (comparing Carmen v. Fox Film Corp., 269 F 928 (2d Cir. 1920),
reversing, 258 F. 703 (S.D.N.Y. 1919) (equity) with Carmen v. Fox Film Corp., 198 N.Y.S. 766
(N.Y. App. Div. 1923) (law) and N. Pac. Lumber Co. v. Oliver, 596 P.2d 931 (Or. 1979) (equity)
with Gratreak v. N. Pac. Lumber Co., 609 P2d 375 (Or. Ct. App. 1980) (law)). Indeed, the
doctrine of stare decisis embodies the ideal that like cases be treated alike. HUHN, supra note
315, at 16; id at 41-43 (precedent supports the stability and predictability of law as a guide
to future action); see also Amy Coney Barrett, Procedural Common Law, 94 VA. L. REV. 813, 815,
827-29 (2008) (placing precedent within federal procedural common law).
325 For a discussion of how the different remedies were a conflict in substantive rights
and duties of citizens, but not a conflict in the form of the rules themselves, see generally
William Searle Holdsworth, The Relation of the Equity Administered by the Common Law Judges to
the Equity Administered by the Chancellor, 26 YALE L.J. I (1916); 1 AUsTIN WAKEMAN Scorr, THE
LAW OF TRUSTS §I (2d ed. 1956) ("There is no conflict in form ... there is only a conflict in
substance.").
326 See MEGARRY & BAKER, supra note 6, at 7 ("There is much truth in the view that equity
is a historical accident.") (quoting the Honorable Robert Megarry of the Chancery Division
of the High Court of England); Stevens, supra note 26, at 351 (explaining that the distinction
between law and equity was not necessary or essential-but historical); see also Philpott v.
Superior Court, 36 P.2d 635, 637 (Cal. 1934) (discussing the "parity of law and reason which
governs both species of courts" (quoting II COOLEY'S BLACKSTONE § 436, at I181-82 (4th ed.)));
Edelman & Degeling, supra note 324, at 2 (explaining that Justice Keith Mason denies any
particular characteristic of equitable doctrine apart from historical development); cf id.(noting
that Sir Anthony Mason and Professor Lionel Smith accept there are unique characteristics of
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was equal in fact is becoming equal in law."' To be sure, courts seem less
likely to ignore the inconsistent outcomes associated with the unequal
treatment of unclean hands when the interests at stake are their own."'
Thus, discrimination against unclean hands in legal cases is doubtful
when the application of the defense achieves a targeted and immediate
instrumental aim of court protection rather than merely furthering the
overall, albeit more abstract, objectives of justice, fairness, and equality.3 2 9
The recent decisions in Michigan, creating a policy-based exception to
the conventional prohibition against unclean hands at law when litigation
misconduct obstructs the judicial function, illustrate this phenomenon.3 30
equity that may limit analogies to the common law in certain cases).
327 The "structural" approach to legal analysis that involves inferring rules from the rela-
tionship among ancillary doctrines was popularized by Philip Bobbitt, a constitutional scholar,
as one of six heuristic devices ("modalities") of interpreting the Constitution. PHILIP BOBBITT,
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 12-13 (1991). Others have adapted Bobbitt's structural
argument outside the constitutional law discussion. See T Leigh Anenson, Creating Conflicts
of Interest: Litigation as Interference with the Attorney-Client Relationship, 43 Am. Bus. L.J. 173,
203-05 (2oo6) (using the structural argument in borrowing from groundless litigation theories
in litigious interference cases redressing a separation of client and counsel); Gergen, supra
note 324, at I178 & n.i6 (interference tort); Dennis Patterson, The Pseudo-Debate over Default
Rules in Contract Law, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 235, 240-242, 242 n.I6 (1993) (contract); see
also William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning,
42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 322 (1990) (outlining an analogous model of statutory interpretation).
In particular, Wilson Huhn articulated a pluralist model of analysis that may be applied to all
areas of the law and described Bobbit's structural, ethical, and prudential methods of legal
reasoning as "policy" arguments consisting of a predictive portion and a value judgment. See
Wilson R. Huhn, Teaching LegalAnalysis Usinga Pluralistic Model of Law, 36 GoNz. L. REV. 433,
456 (2000-0 I).
328 SeeAnenson, Process-Based Theory of Unclean Hands, supra note 4, at 511, 518-20, 526,
530-32 (explaining that the courts consider the court protection policy paramount in applying
unclean hands at law); see also Yeo, supra note 20, at 157 ("Unconscientiousness in the exercise
of legal rights provides the reason for the intervention [of equity]."); cf Chafee 1, supra note
2, at 895 (discussing the overall policy behind unclean hands is that "a court of justice should
be very reluctant to do injustice"). Cases emphasize unclean hands as a protector of the pro-
cess. See, e.g., Manown v. Adams, 598 A.2d 821, 826 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991), rev'd on other
grounds, 615 A.2d 6i i, 620 (Md. 1992) ([T]he policy underlying the clean hands doctrine is
institutional. The objective is to prevent the court from assisting in fraud or other inequitable
conduct."); Maldonado v. Ford Motor Co., 719 N.W.2d 809, 818 (Mich. 2oo6) ("The 'clean
hands doctrine' applies not only for the protection of the parties but also for the protection of
the court." (citation omitted)); see also discussion supra Part II.
329 See Anenson, Process-Based Theory of Unclean Hands, supra note 4, at 542-43 (propos-
ing process-based theory of unclean hands where application at law is based on sliding scale
between court and party protection); see also Anenson, supra note 314, at 662-63 (listing similar
policies for courts to create exceptions to the elements of equitable estoppel); cf HUHN, supra
note 315, at 135 (describing the range of policies as "abstract values ... instrumental concerns
... or targeted societal goals").
33o For conduct considered unclean hands that interferes with the judicial mission by
tainting the jury pool, see Maldonado v. FordMotor Co., 719 N.W.2d 809, 815-18 (Mich. 2oo6)
or obstructing witness testimony, see Cummings v. Wayne Cnty., 533 N.W.2d 13, 14 (Mich. Ct.
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Perhaps courts are still drawn to equity because it seems less possible
(and rewarding) to approach the world through the myth of objectivity.3 As
in art or literature, similitude is often more revealing than verisimilitude. 3 2
Judges turn to equity and discretionary defenses like unclean hands to draw
meaning from the bombardments of experience.3 3 3 With its malleability,
App. 1995). See also Smith v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 124 F.R.D. 103, 105-07 (D. Md. 1989) (per-
jury); Bartlett v. Dunne, No. C.A. 89-3051, 19 89 WL II0258, at *2-3 (R.I. Super. Ct. Nov. io,
1989) (perjury). Ancient equity courts exercised their power to remedy abuses of the common
law process. See Hohfeld, supra note to, at 556, 56o-6i (citing examples); Mason, supra note
26, at 52-53, 75 (noting the judicial power in equity to prevent abuse of the common law
process); cf Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308, 339
(1999) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (justifying the jurisdictional
basis of the modern English practice of Mareva injunctions on "equity's traditional power to
remedy the 'abuse' of legal process" (citation omitted)).
331 See Morton J. Horwitz, The Changing Common Law, 9 DALHOUSIE L.J. 55, 62-63 (1984)
(discussing the realist attack on the intellectual foundations of conceptualism and formalism);
Nim Razook, Obeying Common Law, 46 Am. Bus. L.J. 55, 69-73 (2009) (discussing how realist
scholars like Frank, Llewellyn, and Holmes saw their role as one of refuting legal determin-
ism); see also HUHN, supra note 315, at 10-1I ("Rules of law do not describe objective truth,
they reflect subjective intentions."); see id. at 57 n. 149 (explaining that H.L.A. Hart's criticism
of legal formalism was not due to "its reliance upon logic, but its failure to acknowledge the
... ambiguity of legal rules" (internal parenthetical omitted) (citing Douglas Lind, Logic,
Intuition, andthe PositivistLegacy of H.L.A. Hart, 52 SMU L. REV.I 35, 152-57 (1999))); RICHARD
A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 405 (1995); accord Durfee, supra note 9, at x (commenting that
Chafee, a practitioner, professor, and scholar of equity jurisprudence, looked at law as a "kit
of tools" to repair, sharpen, or redesign). Justice Cardozo described the diverse and opposing
values served by law in attempting to do justice:
The reconciliation of the irreconcilable, the merger of antitheses,
the synthesis of opposites, these are the great problems of the law...
We fancy ourselves to be dealing with some ultra-modern controversy,
the product of the clash of interests in an industrial society. The prob-
lem is laid bare, and at its core are the ancient mysteries crying out for
understanding ....
BENJAMIiN N. CARDOZO, THE PARADOXES OF LEGAL SCIENCE 4 (3 d prtg. 2oo6); see also Oliver
Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, io HARv. L. REV. 61 (1897), reprinted in I iO HARV. L.
REV. 991, 1000 (997) (urging educators to train lawyers to consider the "social advantage" of
the rule and to educate them to see that "they were taking sides upon debatable and often
burning questions").
332 In literary terms, a version of verisimilitude is where the reader is willing to suspend
disbelief. See Robert P. Ashley, What Makes a Good Novel?, 6O ENG. 1.596,596-97 (1971) (discuss-
ing Samuel Coleridge's version of verisimilitude); cf Truth/ikeness, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY (Spring 2007), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2oo7/entries/truthlikeness/
(noting that the literary idea of verisimilitude has been applied in the philosophical context).
In legal parlance, verisimilitude could be equated to legal fictions like the labels "law" and
"equity." Cf Frederic M. Bloom, Jurisdiction's Noble Lie, 61 STAN. L. REV. 971, 1o18 (2009)
(characterizing the fixed and unyielding nature of jurisdiction as a "noble lie" in that it does
not actually deceive); L.L. Fuller, LegalFictions (pt. 1), 25 ILL. L. REv'. 363, 367 (1930) ("For a
fiction is distinguished from a lie by the fact that it is not intended to deceive.").
333 Cf NEWMAN, supra note 6, at 13 ("Twenty-three centuries ago Aristotle said that
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ingenuity, immediacy, and complexity-the doctrine of "clean hands"
provides a fresh way to make sense of the world.3 34
Be it equity or law, however, the nature of jurisprudence is that it
"often accretes by fragments, taking shape mosaically-its import visible
only when one stands back and sees it whole."335 But the "stories it tells
may be no more than metaphors."3 1 It is notable that decisions both for
and against use of the defense at law have been made without expressly
considering the meaning of the merger.33 1 Other opinions are ambiguous as
equity is that idea of justice which contravenes the written law." (citation omitted)); Anton-
Hermann Chroust, Aristotle's Conception of "Equity" (Epieikeia), 18 NOTRE DAME LAW. 1 19, 125-
26 (1942) (explaining the meaning of equity as a component of justice); Darien Shanske, Note,
Four Theses: Preliminary to an Appeal to Equity, 57 STAN. L. REV. 2053, 2054 (2005) ("Aristotle's
account of equity has been received into the legal tradition many times and this reception is
ongoing today."). See generally Anenson, supra note 3.
334 The equitable defense of unclean hands has been most recently suggested as a
supplement to the regulatory regime in the current financial crisis in an effort to reduce or
eliminate excessive executive compensation. See generally T Leigh Anenson & Donald 0.
Mayer, "Clean Hands" and the CEO: Equity as an Antidote for Excessive Compensation, 12 U. PA.
J. Bus. L. 947 (2010) (explaining unclean hands as a defense to contract law and outlining its
use in the executive pay context). Equity has been used to understand administrative law,
Charles E. Clark, The Handmaid ofJustice, 23 WASH. U. L.Q. 297, 303 (1938), alternative dispute
resolution, Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, The Merger of Law and Mediation: Lessons from Equity
Jurisprudence and Roscoe Pound, 6 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 57, 57-60 (2004), and, most
recently, presidential powers, Eric A. White, Note, Examining Presidential Power Through the
Rubric of Equity, io8 MICH. L. REV. 113 (2oo9). Cf Anenson, supra note 314, at 669 (conclud-
ing that the invocation of equitable estoppel "enables juridical actors to create magic-what
Pound called 'juristic chemistry"'-in resolving cases (quoting Roscoe Pound, The Theory of
Judicial Decision, 36 HARv. L. REv. 641,643 (1923))).
335 Deborah Tall & John D'Agata, The LyricEssay, HOBART AND WILLIAM SMITH COLLEGES,
(20o), http://www.hws.edulacademics/senecareview/lyricessay.aspx (describing the lyric es-
say as a unique style of literature published in the Seneca Review). What Helen Vendler says
of the lyric poem is true of jurisprudence: "It depends on gaps.... It is suggestive rather than
exhaustive." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Another literary reference squares with
the idea of common law-making: "It might move by association, leaping from one path of
thought to another by way of imagery or connotation, advancing by juxtaposition or sidewind-
ing poetic logic." Id. (describing the lyric essay as a genre of literature). As Holmes put it,
through jurisprudence we might hope to "connect ... with the universe and catch an echo of
the infinite." Holmes, supra note 331, at 1oo9; see also Karl N. Llewellyn, The Case Law System
in America, 88 COLum. L. REV. 989, 991 (1988).
336 Tall & D'Agata, supra note 335.
337 For courts applying unclean hands without discussion of its application to legal relief,
see Mallis v. Bankers Trust Co., 615 F.2d 68, 74-76 (2d Cir. 1980); Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp.,
412 E2d 700, 704 (5 th Cir. 1969); Blain v. Doctor's Co., 272 Cal. Rptr. 250, 258-59 (Ct. App.
1990); Kirkland v. Mannis, 639 P.2d 671, 673 (Or. Ct. App. 1982); see also A.I. Gage Plumbing
Supply Co. v. Local 300 of the Int'l. Hod Carriers, 20 Cal. Rptr. 86o, 865-66 (Dist. Ct. App.
1962) (considering unclean hands in damages action without discussing the merger of law
and equity). Correspondingly, courts precluding unclean hands in actions at law tend to rely
on pre-merger precedent or none at all. See, e.g., Gen. Dev. Corp. v. Binstein, 743 F. Supp.
1115, 1133-34 (D.N.J. 1990) (applying Florida, Connecticut, and Massachusetts law); Hasbro
Bradley, Inc. v. Coopers & Lybrand, 515 N.Y.S.2d 461,463 (App. Div. 1987).
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to whether they are making new law and extending unclean hands to legal
relief or are merely a remnant of the ancient equitable clean-up doctrine."'
Lower federal courts in diversity actions are inconsistent in choosing state
or federal law for the application and/or definition of unclean hands."'
Nor do they seem to address their source of authority to apply unclean
hands in statutory versus common law causes of action. 340 Significantly,
these unanswered questions as to sources of law hold importance for the
constitutional doctrines of separation of powers and federalism.'
The fact that some courts have not directly addressed the issue of in-
corporation (or related issues) involving unclean hands is perhaps a con-
sequence of the omission of equity from the standard law school curricu-
lum. 42 As a result, "[l]awyers often advocate doctrines of law and equity
without consciousness of the historic boundary between them." 3 3The con-
338 See Big Lots Stores, Inc. v. Jaredco, Inc., 182 F. Supp. 2d 644, 652 (S.D. Ohio 2002);
Urecal Corp. v. Masters, 413 F. Supp. 873, 876 (N.D. Ill. 1976); discussion supra note 134; see
also Judith Resnik, Constricting Remedies: The Rehnquist Judiciary, Congress, and Federal Power, 78
IND. L.J. 223, 253-54 (2003) (discussing the ambiguity left by the decision of Grupo Alexicano
de Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308 (1999), regarding the availability
of equitable relief when both legal and equitable remedies are pled and whether the issue
should be determined by discerning if equity "predominates" or alternatively, if it is "ancil-
lary" or "incidental" to the legal relief claimed).
339 See discussion supra note 62.
340 See Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp., 412 F.2d 700, 704 (5 th Cir. 1969) (finding the applica-
tion of unclean hands furthers the purposes of the statute); Bieter Co. v. Blomquist, 848 F
Supp. 1446, L449 (D. Minn. 1994) (deciding the applicability of unclean hands in statutory
cause of action per the policies of the statute).
341 See Anenson, Process-Based Theory of Unclean Hands, supra note 4, at 532-35 (analyz-
ing how the source of authority to invoke unclean hands has implications for the horizontal
and vertical structures of our government (citing Barrett, supra note 324; Beale, supra note
323)); see also id. (discussing potential differences in implied power between the state and
federal benches).
342 See Jerome Frank, Civil Law Influences on the Common Law-Some Reflections on
"Comparative" and "Contrastive" Law, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 887, 895 n-43 (1956) ("In several
of our leading law schools, there is now no course on 'equity."'); Douglas Laycock, Remedies:
Justice and the Bottom Line, 27 REv. LITIG. 1, 7 (2007) ("The short explanation is that courses
in damages, equity, and restitution were combined into a single course in remedies.") (citing
Douglas Laycock, How Remedies Became a Field: A History, 27 REV. LITIG. 161 (2oo8)); Jack B.
Weinstein & Eileen B. Hershenov, The Effect of Equity on Alass Tort Law, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV.
269, 272 ("[Eiquity was taught as a separate course until the 1950s."); see also Edward D. Re,
Introduction to SELECTED ESSAYS ON EQUITY, supra note 26, at xiv ("[Tihe elimination of a sepa-
rate course in equity in many of the law schools in the United States has caused much that is
truly valuable in the study of equity to be either completely lost or scattered to the point of
useless dilution in various courses."); Stevens, supra note 314, at 422 (criticizing trend of law
schools that do not offer a separate course in equity). Butsee Hohfeld,supra note io, at 537-38
(agreeing with Maitland's view to eliminate a separate course in equity so as not to preserve
the distinctiveness of equity).
343 Anenson, supra note 3, at 480 (citation omitted); see also id. ("It may also explain why
courts have applied unclean hands to actions at law without discussion." (citation omitted)).
Erosion of the law-equity distinction has been so complete in certain cases that courts and
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fusion surrounding some of these decisions is possibly also reflective of the
lack of guidance from the courts of last resort.3" Only recently in Michigan
has a high court accepted unclean hands, albeit in a potentially narrow class
of cases involving litigation misconduct. 345 The United States Supreme
Court has not taken a position on unclean hands during the seventy-year
period following the consolidation of procedures in the federal system. 346
With the legal status of unclean hands unsettled in most federal and state
jurisdictions, it is time for more courts to begin a conversation about the
merger and what it now means for the defense of unclean hands. Notably,
the fusion of unclean hands into claims for legal relief will likely have im-
plications for other equitable defenses like laches that traditionally were
commentators mistake their origins. See Decatur Ventures, L.L.C. v. Stapleton Ventures, Inc.,
No. i:o 4 -CV-o562-JDT-WTL, 2oo6 WL 1367436, at *4 (S.D. Ind. May 17, 2oo6) (plaintiffs
mistaken belief that in pari delicto defense was equitable), order amended, 2oo6 WL 3305122,
at *1-3, *13 (S.D. Ind. Aug 16, 2oo6). Professor Laycock cited two cases to make the point
that "judges and lawyers no longer understand what such references mean." Laycock, supra
note 26, at 70, 81 (citing In re De Laurentiis Entm't Grp. Inc., 963 F.2d 1269, 1272 (9th Cir.
1992) (mis-describing quasi-contract as an equitable remedy); Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 5oo
U.S. 248 (1993) (construing 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (1988))). In applying precedent that bans
pure discretionary equitable defenses like unclean hands or laches, courts have erroneously
banned fully incorporated equitable defenses like estoppel. See Howe v. Fiduciary Trust Co.,
No. 97-2206, 2001 Mass. Super. LEXIS 135, at *30-31 (Super. Ct. Apr. 19, zooi); Clarke v.
Brunswick Corp., 211 N.W.2d 101, 102-03 (Mich. Ct. App. 1973); Russell v. Casebolt, 384
S.W.2d 548, 553 (Mo. 1964). While this oversight may initially appear to contribute to the fu-
sion of law and equity, see Mason, supra note 26, at 62, it actually adds to the lack of coherence
and consistency in the law and undermines its development.
344 The lack of guidance from state supreme courts could be both a cause of the confu-
sion in the lower courts and a consequence of the lack of education and training on equitable
principles and doctrines. Notably, the US Supreme Court has made errors in its decisions
regarding what theories are historically equitable. See John H. Langbein, WhatERISA Means
By "Equitable": The Supreme Courts Trail of Error in Russell, Mertens, and Great-West, 103
COLUM. L. REV. 1317 (2003). In an effort to provide new direction in patent law, the Federal
Circuit Court of Appeals has decided to rehear en banc the issue of inequitable conduct and
review its link to equity and unclean hands. Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 374
F App'x 35 (Fed. Cir. 2010). See Randall R. Rader, Always at the Margin: Inequitable Conduct
in Flux, 69 AM. U. L. REV. 777,784 (2oo) (discussing the Federal Circuit's failure to restrain
the doctrine). See also Robert J. Goldman, Evolution of the Inequitable Conduct Defense in Patent
Litigation, 7 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 37, 67 (1993) ("Over a period of 37 years, various circuits exper-
imented with three different standards of materiality and two different standards of intent.")
(discussing the inequitable conduct defense derived from unclean hands before the creation
of the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals).
345 See Maldonado v. Ford Motor Co., 719 N.W.2d 809, 818 (Mich. 2006); see also discus-
sion supra notes 174-77 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the state supreme courts
that have rejected the defense at law, see supra Part I.
346 The Supreme Court has not considered the issue of unclean hands despite expressly
incorporating other equitable defenses like estoppel into legal actions even prior to the fed-
eral merger of law and equity in the 1938 Federal Rules of CivilProcedure. See Kirk v. Hamilton,
1o2 U.S. 68, 78 (1880) (declaring that "there would seem no reason why its application should
be restricted in courts of law"); see also discussion supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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exclusive to equity.347
A century ago, Roscoe Pound feared the disappearance of equity in a
merged system.348 Since then, scholars have debated the merits of more or
fewer equitable principles and procedures in our unified systems.3 4 ' But
there has been consistent recognition by the legal community that the labels
"law" and "equity" should cease to determine the outcome of cases."' At
347 See discussion supra notes 38-43 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court had
the opportunity to resolve the fusion debate in the context of the equitable defense oflaches,
but avoided it and ruled on other grounds. See Cnty. of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation of
New York State, 470 U.S. 226, 244-45 (1985) (discussing but not deciding whether equitable
defense of laches applies to bar legal relief); cf City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation of
New York, 544 U.S. 197, 217, 221 (2o05) (invoking laches to bar equitable relief). The Second
Circuit later adopted laches at law. See Cayuga Indian Nation of New York v. Pataki, 413 F3 d
266, 273-74, 276 (2d Cir. 2oo5). The legal adoption of laches in the area of Indian land claims
has been the focus of scholarly attention. See, e.g., Matthew L.M. F-letcher, 7he Supreme Courts
Indian Problem, 59 HASTINGs L.J. 579 (2oo8); Kathryn E. Fort, The New Laches: Creating Title
Wkhere None Existed, U6 GEO. MASON L. REV. 357 (2009).
348 Pound, supra note 18, at 35; supra note 25 and accompanying text; cf Sidney Post
Simpson, Fifty Years ofAmerican Equiy, 5o HARV. L. REV 17i. I79-81 (1936) (predicting the
future of equity is good and certain because it is a flexible tradition for allowing growth in the
law).
349 See Thomas 0. Main, Traditional Equity and Contemporary Procedure, 78 WAsu. L. RE.
429, 495-507, 514 (2003) (calling for more equity-like civil procedures): Mason, supra note 26,
at 75 ("Debate about the fusion of law and Equity goes back for centuries."); Nolan-IIaley,
supra note 334, at 59 n.15 (calling for a return to the values of equity in mediation) (citing
Martha C. Nussbaum, Equity and Mercy, 22 PHIL. & PUB. AFE. 83 (0993)); id. at 67-70 (same):
Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: 7he Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in
Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909,975-1002 (1987) (arguing for less equiry-like civil
processes); see also Garrard Glenn & Kenneth Redden, Equity:A Visitto the FoundingFathers, 31
VA. L. REV. 753 (1945) (reviewing history of equity to demonstrate that the traditional theory
of the equitable process can help solve modern problems).
350 See, e.g., Chafee, supra note 26, at iii-iv; Laycock, supra note 317, at 693 (noting that
law-equity jurisdictional "rules ... have become obstacles to decision instead of guides");
Laycock, supra note 26, at 78: Pound, supra note 18, at 35; see also CHAFEE, supra note 5, at
303 ("One of the chief troubles with the frequent preoccupation of judges with questions
of power is that it makes them slide over much more important questions of wisdom and
fairness which ought to receive careful attention."); NEWMAN, supra note 6, at 29-30; Garvey,
supra note 42, at 67. Certain judges are in accord with legal scholars on this point. See. e.g.,
Maksym v. Loesch, 937 F.2d 1237, 1248 (7th Cir. 1991) (Posner, J.) ("[Wlith the merger of law
and equity there is no longer a good reason to distinguish between the legal and equitable
character of defenses, save as the distinction may bear on matters unaffected by the merger,
such as the right to trial by jury in cases at law, a right preserved in federal courts by the Seventh
Amendment." (citation omitted)); USH Ventures v. Global Telesystems Grp., Inc., 796 A.2d 7,
15-16 (Del. Super. Ct. 2000); Mason, supra note 26, at 70 ("Labels can operate as signposts,
but they can also be misleading either because they may conflate separate concepts or (when
different labels are seized upon as automatic indicators of distinctive legal concepts) because
they may impede parallels or analogies being drawn (that is, principled fusion)."). Outside the
United States, there have been strong opponents of fusion. See Edelman & Degeling, supra
note 324, at 1; see also Mason, supra note 26, at 45 (commenting that academic cultures have
also done their part to preserve them in Australia).
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minimum, my research on this subject aims to extend that reasoning to the
equitable defense of unclean hands.3"'
Critics may complain of unclean hands on its own merits-that
the defense may allow judges to go off on an uncharted course through
interlocking webs of idea, circumstance, and language.352 With any
discretionary decision, there is the possibility of uncertain and inconsistent
outcomes.s But before condemning the defense in this manner, courts
should first expose unclean hands to the whole of law and not deprive
litigants of its utility in an entire class of cases where they are seeking legal
relief.3 54 The experiential process of precedent moves legal precepts from
351 See generally Anenson, supra note 3; Anenson, Process-Based Theory of Unclean Hands,
supra note 4.
352 See, e.g., Chafee I, supra note 2, at 878 (calling unclean hands a mischievous doctrine
capable of causing harm); see also HENRY L. NICCLINTOCK, HANDBOOK OF EQuITY 29 (1936)
(noting that the "brevity and generality" of the maxims of equity "prevent them from having
much utility" in predicting court action in a certain situation); Cf CARDOzo, supra note 318,
at 23 ("The rules and principles of case law have never been treated as final truths, but as
working hypotheses, continually retested in those great laboratories of the law, the courts of
justice. Every new case is an experiment; and if the accepted rule which seems applicable
yields a result which is felt to be unjust, the rule is reconsidered. It may not be modified at
once, for the attempt to do absolute justice in every single case would make the develop-
ment and maintenance of general rules impossible; but if a rule continues to work injustice,
it will eventually be reformulated. The principles themselves are continually retested; for if
the rules derived from a principle do not work well, the principle itself must ultimately be
re-examined." (quoting MUNROE SMITH, JURISPRUDENCE 2i (1908))). See also Anenson, supra
note 3, at 507 ("[Wlhile discretionary doctrines such as unclean hands may be criticized by
lawyers as lacking legal certainty and predictability, they paradoxically provide legal certainty
for laypersons and foster legitimacy in our courts."); accord Llewellyn, supra note 335, at 991
(explaining that Llewellyn justified the case law system in America by explaining how judi-
cial decisions provide congruence between legal rules and "'real-life norms"' which fosters
legitimacy in our courts).
353 See, e.g., Henry J. Friendly, Indiscretion About Discretion, 31 EmoRY L.J- 747, 758
(1982); Steve Hedley, Rival Taxonomies Within Obligations: Is There a Problem?, in EQuITY IN
COMMERCIAL LAw, supra note 2o, at 77, 87 (advocating the continued use of equity but noting
that there will be legitimate concerns over the degree of flexibility that should be allowed)
(citing articles on debate over "discretionary remedialism" (citation omitted)); Rendleman,
supra note 26, at 64 (citing articles devoted to discretion in substance, procedure, and juris-
prudence); see also NEWMAN, supra note 6, at 15-16 (citing "equality" as one of the necessary
virtues of justice (quoting FREDERICK POLLOCK, JURISPRUDENCE 37 (5 th ed. 1923))); Robert G.
Bone, Who Decides?: A Critical Look at Procedural Discretion, 28 CARDozo L. REV. 1961, 1975-
2002 (2007) (questioning trial judge discretion to properly administer procedure); Main, supra
note 349, at 444 ("[Tihere is no more fundamental social interest than that law should be uni-
form and impartial." (citation omitted)). Notably, the lack of reconciliation between relevant
legal and equitable bodies of law is also detrimental to the certainty and predictability of law.
See Anenson, supra note 327, at 205; Gergen, supra note 324, at 122 1-22.
354 See Anenson, supra note 3. at 508 (commenting that the defense has "served as a
significant safety valve in equity cases for more than two hundred years" and arguing that
the rule of relatedness provides a reasonable prescription for the application of the defense
(citation omitted)); accord Smith, supra note 20, at 38 (discussing the relationship between
equity and law and noting that discretion is not necessarily an injustice); see also Anenson,
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the abstract to the particular and placed."' Eliminating an arbitrary and
irrational legal barrier to unclean hands-a doctrine that is by turns formal
and experimental, discursive and fragmentary-will allow courts to build,
at the intersection of appearing law and disappearing equity, a defense that
may account for and preserve the integrity of both." 6
CoNcLusIoN
The merger of law and equity may not have remade the world of
civil procedure, but it changed the terms of discourse sufficiently that
Process-Based Theory of Unclean Hands, supra note 4, at 562 (noting that attempting to eradicate
unclean hands from our case law is not within the realm of reality as lawyers are asserting it
and some courts are listening). In addition to litigant protection, the defense of unclean hands
also serves the interests of the court in providing a fair and impartial administration of justice.
Id. at 522-41 (discussing primary purpose of unclean hands is court protection and proposing
a process-based theory of application).
355 Wilson Huhn's insight was that standards evolve into rules through the use of for-
malistic analogies that identify the factual similarities in the cases that apply the standard. See
Wilson Huhn, The Stages Of Legal Reasoning: Formalism, Analogy, and Realism, 48 VH iL. L. REV.
305, 378-79 (2oo3). Rules evolve into standards through the use of realistic analogies that
identify the interests justifying exceptions to the rule. Id. at 307 (proposing that precedent
bridges the transition between formalism and realism and vice versa); see also Anenson, supra
note 314, at 643-51 (illustrating the phenomena in cases considering the equitable defense
of estoppel); cf Amy Coney Barrett, Stare Decisis and Due Process, 74 U. Coi o. L. REV. 101 I.
1072 (2003) ("Allowing an issue to be hashed out multiple times compensates for the imper-
fections-the very humanness-in the process of decisionmaking. It allows the courts to see
a more complete picture before rushing to judgment.").
356 See Smith, supra note 20, at 27 (calling for a balanced approach to the fusion of law
and equity). Stephen Burbank explained:
We have been fortunate that our system has included, most of the
time and in most American jurisdictions, both law and equity, each
of which requires the other and both of which, in combination, have
helped us over more than two hundred years to make social and eco-
nomic progress. That progress has often not come easily, and there is
much of it still to be made.
Stephen B. Burbank, The Bitter with the Sweet: Tradition, History, and Limitations on Federal
JudicialPower-A Case Study, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1291, 1346 (2000); seealso -ledley, supra
note 353, at 87 ("A certain amount of theoretical incoherence is a necessary price for allowing
both common law and equity to develop; allowing both to develop is necessary if they are
not to become irrelevant to the needs of today." (citation omitted)). Emily Sherwin reminds
us that there is restraint in the common law construction process. Emily Sherwin, A Defense of
AnalogicalReasoning in Law, 66 U. Cm. L. REV. I 179, 1 186-97 (1999) (explaining the benefits of
judge-made law as providing numerous data for decision-making, representing the collabora-
tive efforts of judges over time, correcting the biases that might lead judges to discount the
force of precedent, and exerting a conservative force in the law to change at a gradual pace);
see also Anensonsupra note 314, at 659-60 (discussing how equitable defenses are "built brick
by brick on the backs of numerous judges bound by past precedents in saying what the law
is-one case at a time" (citation omitted)).
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expectations have been simultaneously raised and dashed. " Even the
Herculean efforts of scholars have not been able to write the labels "law"
and "equity" into non-existence."' And in the ensuing confusion over the
status of unclean hands at law, conflicting decisions rule the day.359
This Article has analyzed past and present adjudications of unclean
hands that may have implications for its future. The digression into court
decisions is an effort to explain the doctrinal role of the defense in legal
cases. Assessing these episodes of adoption additionally helps to diagnose
the impasse about the meaning of the merger in state and federal civil
procedure that is at the heart of the debate over the legal incorporation of
unclean hands. To be sure, the foregoing case-based analysis shows how
competing concepts of "law and "equity" crash into each other, leaving
behind the smoking wreckage of dogma. The continued reliance on fictions
357 See Burbank, supra note 356, at 1292 ("It did not take long after Professor Chayes
celebrated the triumph of equity in public law litigation to recognize that the announcement
was premature-part prophecy, partly unfulfilled-at least if equity meant what he thought
or hoped it meant." (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); accord Edelman,
supra note 313, at 380 ("'[Tlhe dream has been a long time coming.' It seems, in Australia at
least, that the dream still has some time to come." (quoting Justice Mason of the New South
Wales Court of Appeals in reference to Maitland's prophesy)); see also Mason, supra note 313,
at 17 (listing examples of judges who "fashioned new principles applicable at common law
or equity by drawing upon the companion body of law"); Smith, supra note 25, at 26 (citing
Mansfield and Blackstone as passionate advocates of substantive fusion). Compare Clark, supra
note 18, at 2 ("The day will come when lawyers will cease to inquire whether a given rule be
a rule of equity or a rule of common law...." (quoting FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, EQUITY
20 (1910))), and Sward, supra note 151, at 385 (discussing how the original drafters of the
Field Code intended to abolish "'not only theforms but the "inherent" distinctions' between
law and equity" (citation omitted)), with T.A. GREEN, A GENERAL TREATISE ON PLEADING AND
PRACTICE IN CIVIL PROCEEDINGS AT LAW AND IN EQUITY UNDER THE CODE SYSTEM 51-52 (1879)
(advising that the "substance of [common law and equitable actions] remains unchanged and
wholly unchangeable, and cannot be united, fused or commingled into one by any human
legislation"); see also NEWMAN, supra note 6, at 53 ("'reform ... came too soon"' for the newer
equitable doctrines (quoting Roscoe Pound (citation omitted), Address before the Nebraska
State Bar Association (Nov. 24, 1908))); Anenson, Process-Based Theory of Unclean Hands, supra
note 4, at 517-18 ("Despite the rhetoric of completing the union of law and equity, procedural
reform was initially interpreted by most courts to forever bar this presumably substantive
defense in legal cases." (citations omitted)); Pound, supra note 18, at 26.
358 As discussed supra note 26 and accompanying text, Zechariah Chafee, and more re-
cently, Douglas Laycock, have advocated the removal of the labels "law" and "equity" since
unification. See supra note 350 (referencing Judge Posner of the US Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit, and Justice Mason of the Court of Appeals of New South Wales, Australia);
accord ANDREW BURROWS, FUSING COMMON LAW AND EQUITY: REMEDIES, RESTITUTION AND
REFORM 44 (2002) (Hochelaga Lectures 2001) (asserting "to see the two strands of authority,
at law and in equity, moulded into a coherent whole" (citation omitted)); Andrew Burrows, We
Do This at Common Law but That in Equity, 22 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 4 (2002); see also Smith,
supra note 25, at 22-23 (noting that "terminological fusion, non-substantive in itself, is liable
to lead to substantive fusion").
359 See discussion supra Parts II; cf Mason, supra note 313, at 14 (noting confused state
of equity in Australia due to lack of principled fusion).
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developed during a long-obsolete form of judicial organization is the very
antithesis of the time-honored tradition of equity in law.36 o
Understandably, law-equity talk will be abandoned when new
arguments are sufficiently established to stand on their own.16' Yet judges
must be receptive to the idea of unclean hands at law for these new
notions to take root. Roscoe Pound advised that decisional rules will not
change until the picture of the law also changes in the minds of judges."62
Unfortunately, given the number of cases rejecting or accepting unclean
hands at law without discussion, the depiction of unclean hands in legal
cases seems to be gathering "more dust than light." 6  Surveying the
legal landscape through the lens of unclean hands is meant to spotlight
the debate to allow an accurate view of the defense that will (hopefully)
stimulate contemplation over its social utility in the future.
Equity is hard law. "The surprising absence of scholarly commentary on
360 See, e.g., Hohfeld, supra note 1o, at 567 n.23 (explaining that equity resulted in "a
liberalizing and modernizing of the law" (citation omitted)); Laycock, supra note 26, at 67-68
(explaining that common law without equity would have been a functioning system, but in
many applications it would have been 'barbarous, unjust, absurd' (quoting I FREDERICK
WILLIAM MAITLAND, EQUITY 19 (2d ed. 1936))); Mason, supra note 26, at 74 (commenting that
"the Court of Chancery flowered 'to soften and mollify the Extremity of the Law"' (citation
omitted)); Roscoe Pound, Do We Need a Philosophy of Law?, 5 CoLu!a. L. REV. 339, 350 (1905)
(concluding that "the rise of the court of chancery preserved [our legal system] from medieval
dry rot"); see also Oliver Wendell Holmes, Early English Equity, I LAW.Q. REV. 162, 162-63
(1885) (discussing substantive doctrines developed in chancery); cf Laycock, supra note 26,
at 67 (calling equity without common law "'a castle in the air"' given that the imposition of
equitable duties presupposed legal rights (quoting MAITLAND, supra)).
361 Laycock, supra note 317, at 693; see also CARDOZO, supra note 318, at 35 (stating that
the justification of judicial decisions ultimately depends on the judgment of lawyers).
362 See Pound, supra note 334, at 660; accord Hohfeld, supra note 1o, at 557 (noting how
modes of thought and language may perpetrate the old dual system long after the merger of
law and equity).
363 Studebaker Corp. v. Gittlin, 360 E2d 692, 698 (2d Cir. 1966) (Judge Friendly writing
for the majority) (discussing the irreparable injury rule of remedies). It would be better that
courts address the matter of unclean hands at law directly and correctly. See generally Anenson,
supra note 3, at 508-o9 (calling for such explicit recognition of Unclean hands in legal cases);
see also HUHN, supra note 315, at 63 ("The disclosure of the true reasons for a decision per-
forms a valuable function: the stated premises of the law will over time be empirically tested
.... " (citation omitted)); Karl Llewellyn, Book Reviews, 52 HARV. L. REV. 700, 703 (1939)
(reviewing 0. PRAUSNITZ, THE STANDARDIZATION OF COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS IN ENGLISH
AND CONTINENTAL LAW (1937)) (emphasizing that "[c]overt tools are never reliable tools"):
NEWMAN, supra note 6, at 261 (noting that the indirect method of adoption is a form of com-
mon law resistance to the expansion of equity that retards wider acceptance of the doctrine).
364 The difficulty of equity is recognized even in those countries that continue a strong
equity tradition. Justice Gummow of the High Court of Australia explained that "[e]quity
is hard law, even to those who have spent much of their professional lives wrestling with
it." William Gummow, Conclusion, in EQUITY IN COMMERCIAL LAW, supra note 20, at 515,
518. Disputes raising equitable theories tend to be legally and factually complex. See gen-
erally DOUG RENDLEMAN, COMPLEX LITIGATION: INJUNCTIONS, STRUCTURAL REMEDIES, AND
CONTEMPT (20Io). The complicated nature of cases raising equitable issues is due in part to
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the fusion of equitable defenses has no doubt contributed to the differing
decisional law of unclean hands in cases seeking legal relief. 65 With the
issue suigeneris in many jurisdictions, the doctrinal analysis provided in this
Article may be a reference for those courts that find themselves suspended
between progress and tradition, unable to move authoritatively in either
direction. 366 Of course, the hermeneutic delay of our case law system means
that whether unclean hands is a dinosaur or a phoenix can only be known
in the fullness of time.167 The foregoing case-based analysis is intended to
enable an informed choice through the exploration of the methodological
stances of modern jurists who, like ancient chancellors, devote their
energies and compassion to the search for just solutions.
the historical content of the rules themselves as well as their foundation in philosophy. See,
e.g., Re, supra note 342, at iv, xii (commenting that no other subject "offers as rich an oppor-
tunity to delve into problems of jurisprudence and the philosophy of law as does equity"). US
Supreme Court jurisprudence on equitable issues has been far from clear or accurate. See, e.g.,
Langbein, supra note 344, at 1338-66 (criticizing historical errors of the US Supreme Court
concerning what theories arose in equity in ERISA litigation); Laycock, supra note 13, at 168
(citing the Supreme Court's confusion over the tests for permanent and preliminary injunc-
tions in eBay Inc. v. MereExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2oo6), as "a spectacular example of the
confusion that can result from litigating a remedies issue without a remedies specialist"). See
also supra note 24.
365 Twenty-five years before my research regarding the fusion of unclean hands at law,
see Anenson, supra note 3; Anenson, Process-Based Theory of Unclean Hands, supra note 4, there
was a student note addressing the topic. See Lawrence, supra note 317; see also Rose, supra note
104 (note discussing fusion of unclean hands in Oregon).
366 See Llewellyn, supra note 335, at 991 (discussing Llewellyn's confidence that legal
scholarship can contribute to the improvement of doctrine); Mason, supra note 26, at 61 (com-
menting on the influence of judges and academics on the issue of fusion and the progress of
the law); see also Emerson H. Tiller & Frank B. Cross, Essay, What is Legal Doctrine?, ioo Nw.
U. L. REV. 51 7 , 5 3 2-33 (2oo6) ("Do legal scholars play a role in limiting the use of certain legal
doctrines or, perhaps, introducing or endorsing legal doctrines that courts will use?"). Even
in those jurisdictions that have a single precedent rejecting unclean hands in cases seek-
ing legal relief, courts should reconsider its application at law. See Barrett, supra note 355, at
1072-74 (proposing that the precedential value of "thin" versus "thick" precedent is different
in that "'[i]t is the existence of the line of cases, not any one case, that gives a proposition its
force").
367 Patterson, supra note 327, at 272 ("Lawyers have always recognized the effects of
'hermeneutic delay'-that is, the meaning of today's precedent can only be known in the
fullness of time." (citation omitted)). Of course, there is the remote possibility of legislative
correction explicating that unclean hands is available against causes of action seeking legal
relief.
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